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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS
by
Chitralekha Rath

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2014
Under the Supervision of Professor Niloy Bose

There is a consensus among economists and political scientists that institutions
are crucial for economic development. Different attributes of institutions like rule of law,
property rights, legal environment, and constraints on executive have profound effects on
a nation’s prosperity, growth and development. Recently economists have recognized that
a system of strong institutions of property rights can enhance efficiency of financial
sector. A significant part of the dissertation deals with the question that is it likely that
causality operates the other way: Does a mature financial market acts as a strong catalyst
for property rights?
The first essay develops a theoretical model of financial intermediation with
incomplete information to augment the notion. The model predicts that the relationship
does exist and is in fact nonlinear. Thus finance acts as propellant for property rights only
after crossing a certain threshold. The second essay presents empirical evidence of
threshold effects in the cross country relationship between property rights and finance
that are consistent with the theory. Further, in a panel of countries, I show that the
exogenous component of financial development helps predict property rights in a sample
of countries where financial markets have crossed a threshold level of development.
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The final essay of the dissertation deals with the effects of legal environment on
financial market. More specifically, it explores the effects of collateral law reforms on
firms’ perceived access to finance by taking a panel of developing countries. I find
evidence that collateral law reforms are effective in improving perceived access to credit.
Moreover the effects are more pronounced when they are accompanied by established
collateral registries for movable and intangible assets. Finally these beneficial effects
seem to increase in the size of the firms.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Dissertation

Since the seminal contribution by Douglas North (1967, 1971), a substantial volume
of research has been directed toward understanding the importance of institutions in
shaping economic behaviors. North describes institutions as “the rules of the game in a
society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human
interactions.” This implies that institutions establish the constraints and determine the
costs and benefits, under which individuals take their economic decisions. North’s
influential work was followed by other seminal contributions, such as, Ronald Coase
(1960), Oliver Willismaosn (1975) and Robert Thomas (1973) who emphasized the
pivotal roles played by political, legal and economic intuitions.
While North’s analysis focused on the broad institutional environment of countries
and the role of state, Coase and Willamson analyzed contracts at firm level and property
rights which was further expanded by Harold Demsetz (1967). In their perspective,
institutions of property rights are crucial since they influence the structure of economic
incentives in society. A system of well-developed property rights provides incentives for
adopting better technology and leads to investment in physical and human capital. This
view has received over whelming support in recent years. Today there is a consensus that
that property rights encourage investment (Besley 1995; Knack and Keefer 1995;
Johnson et.al 2002), entrepreneurship (Murphy et. al 1991) , innovation (Stern, Porter,
and Furman 2000) and are in fact “the fundamental cause of long run growth” (Acemoglu
et al 2005). There are a number of channel through which the above relationship could
transpire. Property rights protection has a direct impact on firm’s investment and
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financing decisions. A firm is at risk of getting inadequate returns on its investments
when the government can seize private assets and does not provide fundamental
protections of property rights. Firms operating in such an environment with insecure
property rights are uncertain about their ability to keep the fruits of their efforts and as a
consequence, decrease their investment activities.
Along with recognizing the importance of the quality of property rights
institution, a predominant view in literature seems to suggest that institutions are
persistent, slow moving and they primarily evolve from initial conditions of countries.
The influential views on historical determinants of property rights indicate that factors
like legal origin, early settler mortality rate or ethnic fractionalization account for much
of the variation in institutional sectors. Proponents of the first school of thought (La Porta
1998), draw sharp distinctions between civil law and common law and suggest that
under British common law emphasis falls on the rights of individuals to ownership and
not on the rights of the state. By contrast, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001; 2002)
suggest mortality rates amongst European colonies to be an exogenous determinant of
property rights. They provide evidence that countries with higher settler mortality rates
introduced extractive institutions and did not protect the property rights of individuals.
Finally, the third view links ethnic composition to the development of property rights.
Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that ruling classes in ethnically diverse countries
attempt to expropriate resources from other ethnic factions. Thus these economies also
tend to have weaker institutions. Collectively, these views suggest that institutions and
conventions have their origins in deep seated historical and geographical factors.
Economic institutions such as property rights, labor relations and land tenure often persist
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over centuries (Bowels and Naidu 2008).
In this dissertation, I take a departure from this conventional view and ally with
the idea proposed by North (1971) which suggests that institutions do change as a
response to technological innovations or due to changes in economic environment. For
this dissertation, such proximate change in the economic environment is the change in the
level of financial development.

This focus on financial market is not arbitrary.

According to the existing literature, there is a strong link between the quality of property
rights institution and the depth and efficiency of the financial sectors. The majority of the
studies assert that the laws which protect property rights and promote enforcement of
ﬁnancial contracts also foster higher levels of ﬁnancial development (La Porta, Lopez-de
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998, 2002), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2002, 2005), Claessens and Laeven (2003), Djankov et.al 2007; De Soto, 2001; Besley
and Ghatak, 2009). This is true because law that limits expropriation and better protects
the rights of shareholders and creditors raises the price that securities fetch in the
marketplace. In turn, this enables more entrepreneurs to finance their investments
externally, leading to the expansion of financial markets. Property rights can also catalyze
“collateral benefits”. Extending and improving property rights allow assets to be pledged
as collateral for loan. In developing countries, plagued with credit crunch and capital
market imperfections, this greatly improves the functioning and workings of credit
markets.
The above literature indicates that the direction of causality runs from property
rights to financial development. But is it possible that the reverse is also true? In other
words, could a mature financial market provide incentives to better codify and protect
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individuals’ rights to ownership? This is the question I explore in the first two chapters of
my dissertation. The final chapter of the dissertation follow the conventional view seeks
to establish an empirical connection between legal reforms and firms’ access to finance.
The first chapter offers a theoretical model in establishing a link running from of
financial intermediation to the quality property rights institution.

In this economy

individuals must access external funds for their investments. However, in the presence of
information friction, financial intermediaries ration credit and some borrowers are denied
loans. Faced with this possibility, borrowers post assets as collateral to improve the terms
and conditions of lending. However these collaterals are subjected to encroachment due
the lack of property rights. Of course, the property owners can take action against this
encroachment in various ways, but such actions come at a cost that is increasing with the
fraction of property the owners wish to safeguard.
On the other hand, apart from the obvious gains, protecting property positively
influences the contractual arrangements in the financial sector. Specifically, the more an
individual spends securing property, the more collateral she can post to better the terms
and conditions of a loan contract. The first chapter exploits this tradeoff and shows that
the marginal net gain from posting collateral increases with the level of financial
development. As a result, more mature financial markets create additional incentives for
individuals to secure their right to ownership.
In this chapter I also exploit the above micro foundations to draw conclusions at
the aggregate level. In doing so, I do not simply aggregate individuals’ behaviors. Instead
I take into account that an individual’s cost of protecting property is affected by the
decisions of other individuals with regard to protecting their own property. This opens
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the analysis up to a richer set of outcomes at the aggregate level. In particular, I show
that aggregate behavior can be characterized by multiple equilibria. Significantly, the
equilibrium which prevails is uniquely determined by the quality of the financial system.
The key implication of such analysis is that the number of agents in the economy
initiating safeguards against encroachment increases monotonically with the development
of the banking system after it has crossed a certain threshold. Below this threshold,
improvements in the contracting environment have no effect on the degree to which
society secures private property.
In summary, the existing literature assert higher quality property rights
institutions promote the enforcement of ﬁnancial contracts and foster higher levels of
ﬁnancial development. In this chapter I offer a theoretical explanation for the causality to
run from financial development to the quality of property rights institution. Further, the
analysis suggests that the level of financial development must cross a threshold before it
can trigger an improvement in the institutions of property rights.
The theory developed in the first chapter offers a straight-forward testable
implication that the relationship between finance and property rights is nonlinear:
stronger financial markets can catalyze positive institutional reforms, but only after
financial markets have crossed into an intermediate range of development. The second
chapter of the dissertation provides a formal test for the theoretical predictions developed
in the first chapter of the dissertation. It presents empirical evidence in favor of the
nonlinear association between finance and rights.
Making use of a procedure suggested in Hansen (1996; 2000), the analysis
tests for a threshold relationship between property rights and finance in a cross-section of
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more than 100 countries over a 35 year period from 1970 to 2005. Data on property rights
were obtained from is an index assembled by James Gwartney and Robert Lawson and
published by the Fraser Institute (with the Cato Institute as its US partner) in their
Economic Freedom of the World: 2009 Annual Report. A useful feature of the index is
that it does not simply reflect laws on the books, but also the overall quality of legal
institutions. The primary determinant of financial development, obtained from word
Bank, was the credit supplied by financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by
nominal GDP at market prices.
Keeping in line with the prediction, the results point to two distinct regimes: One
in which the quality of financial systems is poor, and its effect on property rights is weak,
and the other where the practice of banking has evolved beyond a certain point, such that
further improvements in access to credit are positively associated with the quality of
property rights institutions.

In particular, I find that property rights are essentially

uncorrelated when private credit ratios are below 32 percent. Above this threshold, the
data suggest that the variations in financial development help predict stronger property
rights.
As a robustness exercise, I also considered the index of property rights published
by the Heritage Foundation. Additionally, I varied the measure of financial development.
In particular, I consider the log of the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, as well as the log
of the ratio of commercial bank assets to total banks assets. The predictions of the
threshold regression were robust to these variations.
Evidence of threshold effects and non-linearity does not provide a basis for
structural inferences. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that financial development
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is endogenous. Instrumental variables estimation within endogenous threshold models is
difficult. Estimation methods are available only with certain restrictions (Caner and
Hansen, 2004). Instead I adopt an alternate route and try to resolve the issue of
identification within a panel framework using the Arellano-Bover system GMM
estimator. As a benchmark I begin by estimating this relationship for the full sample of
countries, using fixed effects as well as the system GMM procedure. The coefficients of
finance were positive and highly significant. Based on these findings, it is evident that
financial development is strongly correlated with stronger property rights over time.
Further I link our panel analysis to the earlier analysis of thresholds, by splitting
the data into two sub-samples based on the previously generated threshold estimates.
Thus I estimate two sets of panel regressions; one for the low finance group and one for
the high finance group. I found that the size of the coefficient of finance in low finance
group were either insignificant or smaller than the high finance group. These results
suggest that increases in the volume of credit supplied by the banking sector did not bring
forth stronger property rights in countries where the quality of finance was generally low.
However, where financial conditions were moderately strong to begin with,
improvements in the contracting environment paved the way for stronger property rights.
Other than providing causality from finance to property rights, the results
presented in these two chapters also contribute to the literature on potential linkages
between real and the financial sector of an economy. Over the past decade a substantial
body of research has attempted to identify channels through which financial markets
shape growth prospects in countries. There is a general consensus that financial
development is conducive to growth because it mobilizes savings for investments, creates
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an opportunity to pool risks, improves the allocative efficiency, and lowers transaction
costs. In these two chapters I provide both theoretical and empirical evidence in favor of
an alternate channel through which financial development may foster economic
performance - namely, by creating incentives for countries to strengthen their institutions
of property rights.
The last chapter of the dissertation further analyzes the interplay between legal
environment and financial market. More specifically it explores the effects of legal
reforms on firms’ access to fiancé in developing countries. The legal reforms in this
context refer to reforms in collateral law. These reforms are a result of an ongoing
initiative by the World Bank. The primary objective of these reforms is to ease the credit
constraints faced by firms in low and middle income countries.
The motivation behind these reforms is straight forward. It is well established
both in theory and empirics that collateral reduces incidences of credit rationing and
facilitates efficient allocation of resources. These benefits are particularly large for
developing countries where firms’ ability to put up collateral is limited (Liberti and Mian,
2010) and credit markets are plagued with informational frictions (Luoto et al. 2004).
In practice these reforms take many forms: setting up of collateral registries,
modernizing existing registries or taking initiatives to unify registries electronically
across geographical regions. In this chapter, however the focus is on a set of reforms that
have allowed for a wider set of assets to be used as collateral.
These assets include movable and intangible assets which prior to the reforms
were excluded from the list of collaterals. Studying the effect of this reform is
particularly significant in light of the fact that a recent study conducted in 60 low and
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middle income countries discovered that private firms in these countries own only 20%
of assets in land and buildings which account for nearly 73% of accepted collateral
(Fleisig et al. 2006). Thus this reform would allow the usage of the remaining vast
quantity of unused or ‘dead’ capital as collateral.
The objective of the chapter is to study the effects of these reforms on firms’
access to finance. I have used the Enterprise Survey dataset published by World Bank to
obtain firm-level data on perceived access to finance and other characteristics of firms in
88 low and middle countries over the period 2001-2011. Out of this group, twelve
countries have undergone the said reforms in this time period and now allow intangible
assets such as machinery, inventory, accounts receivables etc. to be used as collateral.
The analysis yields a number of policy relevant findings. First, I find that
broadening the range of assets that can be used as collateral improves access to finance as
perceived by firms. However, these effects are more pronounced where these reforms are
accompanied or followed by movable collateral registries. The above results are not
surprising. While broadening the collateral base helps the borrowers, registries play a
significant role in allowing lenders to more accurately evaluate risks, thus avoiding
adverse selection. This reduces the information asymmetry between borrowers and
lenders, thus ensuring more accurate risk assessment and eventually expanding access to
finance.
Secondly, I also examine if this effect differs across firms of different sizes. The
motivation behind this exercise lies in the fact that smaller firms face greater hurdles in
posting collateral due to limited resources. Thus it is expected that these reforms are
targeted towards easing their credit constrains, However I find that the positive effects of
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collateral reforms on firms’ perceived access to finance increase in the firm size. This
raises the possibility that the realized benefits of these reforms are misaligned with the
main goal of helping smaller firms.
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Chapter 2: Finance and Property Rights: Exploring Other Directions

2.1 Introduction
There is a consensus that property rights encourage investment (Besley 1995;
Knack and Keefer 1995; Johnson et.al 2002), entrepreneurship (Murphy et. al 1991) and
innovation (Stern, Porter, and Furman 2000). Recently economists have recognized that
property rights can catalyze “collateral benefits” which can raise growth through indirect
channels. In particular, a system of strong property rights can enhance efficiency in
financial sectors. This is intuitive since legislation protecting property often encompasses
financial contracts (Kumar et. al, 2001; La Porta et. al, 2002; Claessens and Laeven,
2003; Beck et. al, 2005), and even when it does not, it can improve contracting efficiency
by allowing borrowers to pledge collateral (Djankov et.al 2007; De Soto, 2001; Besley
and Ghatak, 2009). Here the direction of causality runs from property rights to financial
development. But is it possible that the reverse is also true? In other words, could a
mature financial market provide incentives to better codify and protect individuals’ rights
to ownership? This is the question I explore.
There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that institutions are influenced by a
cluster of exogenous initial conditions (La Porta et. al, 1998, 1999; Acemoglu et. al,
2001; Berkowitz et. al, 2003), despite this institutions are not immutable. In fact
institutions have evolved with the economic and social environment. The main argument
in this chapter revolves around this notion. In some countries, especially those adopting
market-oriented reforms, the evolution in institutions has been rapid. Based on an index
published by the Fraser Institute, which ranks the strength of property rights on a 10-
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point scale, property rights strengthened in Chile from 1.1 in 1970 to 7.00 in 2006—a
rating comparable to that in Belgium and 0.7 points higher than that in Italy. Similarly,
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) report a 40 percent improvement in an index
assessing constraints on the executive branch of government between the 1970s and
1990s in 20 countries. There is also evidence that cross-country differences in the quality
of institutions normally traced to differences initial conditions are eroding. Recent
evidence suggests a type of “legal convergence” between common law and civil law
countries, as legislation protecting shareholder’s rights have strengthened in the latter
(Armour et. al., 2010).
Sometimes the proximate triggers for institutional reforms have been shifts in
ideology—Chile under Augusto Pinochet and China under Deng Xiaoping are good
examples. At the same time triggers could be related to economic conditions. For
instance Demsetz (1967) and North (1971, 1981) advocate a theory of institutional
change, where new institutions are formed and existing institutions are mutated when
opportunities for economic profits arise that cannot be captured within existing
institutional arrangements. Both argue that technological innovation and new economic
markets create new profitable opportunities that trigger reform of existing arrangemental
structures. Here I build on this basic idea; I argue that the development of the financial
sector can alter the tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of protecting property rights
which in turn shapes the evolution of property rights institutions.
This focus on financial markets is not arbitrary. Existing literature hints at a
number of channels through which the financial sector can influence the evolution of
institutions such as property rights. For example, certain types of financial reforms, in
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particular those that relax restrictions on the movement of funds can act as a disciplining
force on governments. At the same time an increase in foreign participation can act as a
trigger for institutional improvements by raising their expected benefits and reducing
incumbents’ incentives and abilities to preserve the status quo. Alternatively, since
engineering institutions that guard the rights of investors is costly, deep financial markets
are a prerequisite for certain institutions to be viable (Miletkov and Wintoki 2008). Here I
forward an argument which ties the evolution of property rights to financial structures, by
exploring the role of collateral in financial arrangements. As the role of collateral changes
along the path of financial development, so do individuals’ incentives to invest in the
protection of property.

I provide a formal theoretical rationale with the help of a simple model of
financial intermediation with incomplete information. In our economy individuals must
access external funds to operationalize investments. However, financial intermediaries
ration credit. As a result some borrowers are denied loans. Faced with this possibility,
borrowers post assets as collateral to improve the terms and conditions of lending.
However gaps in the legislative framework allow for encroachment on these assets. This
generates push back from property owners, which can take many forms. For instance,
owners could litigate, they could employ private security, or they could pay public
authorities to protect their assets. Whichever the preferred practice, it comes at a cost that
increases with the fraction of property owners wish to safeguard. On the flip side, in
addition to the obvious gains, protecting property offers non-trivial benefits whose source
lies in how they affect contractual arrangements in the financial sector. Specifically, the
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more an individual spends securing property, the more collateral she can post to better the
terms and conditions of a loan contract. Against this background, I show that the
marginal net gain from posting collateral increases with the level of financial
development. Accordingly, mature financial markets generate additional incentives for
individuals to secure their right to ownership.
In the analysis that follows, I exploit the above micro foundations to draw
conclusions at the aggregate level. In doing so, I do not simply aggregate individuals’
behaviors, taking decision parameters, such as the cost of enforcing property rights as
given. Instead I recognize that an individual’s cost of protecting property is affected by
the decisions other individuals make with regard to protecting their own property. This
opens our analysis up to a richer set of outcomes for aggregate behavior, characterized by
multiple equilibria. Significantly, the equilibrium which prevails is uniquely determined
by the quality of the financial system. The key implication is this: the number of agents in
the economy initiating safeguards against encroachment increases monotonically with the
development of the banking system after it has crossed a certain threshold. Below this
threshold, improvements in the contracting environment have no effect on the degree to
which society secures private property.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section two, I present in
detail the theoretical framework and its implications for the relationship between
financial development and the degree to which states codify and enforce rights to
ownership. Section three concludes with some remarks.
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2.2 Theoretical Framework
2.2.1

The Environment

In this model, events unfold in a small open economy over two periods. The
economy is populated with a countably infinite number of agents of unit mass. I suppose
that these agents are risk neutral, deriving linear utility from consumption which takes
place at the end of the second period. Agents can derive income from a number of
sources. One source is an initial endowment,

of assets, which generates income

payments at the end of the second period. Although these assets offer a gross rate of
return,
this income,

, property rights are not fully enforced in our economy, as a result not all of
, may accrue to agents.

Income can also be derived from business ventures (or projects). Getting these off the
ground entails a fixed investment,

, in the first period. Although the cost of

“operationalizing” a project is always the same, projects can be of two types—low risk
(type-L) and high risk (type-H). Type-L projects yield
in the second period. Whereas, type-H projects convert
units of output with probability
faces an ex-ante probability

-units of output with certainty
units of investment into

-

and zero otherwise. I assume that each agent
of being an owner of a type-L project1 and this

realization is private information.
Since earnings generated from assets are realized at the end of the second period, agents
are unable to finance their own projects. Instead they must contract with banks to obtain a
loan of quantity . I assume that these banks operate in a competitive environment and

1

Alternatively I could assume agents are randomly endowed with different abilities. For example, a fraction of agents could be endowed with better skills such that the expected returns to their investments are
higher. Since skill heterogeneity is not essential to our story, I take a short-cut by assuming that projects
with different risk characteristics are randomly allocated across individuals.
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have access to a perfectly elastic supply of loanable funds which are priced at the
exogenously determined world interest rate, . Since the project-type associated with any
given loan applicant is private information, contractual agreements between the two
parties are designed to encourage self-selection on the part of project owners. In
particular banks will attempt to separate-types by rationing credit to a fraction of
borrowers. However such contracts can only be constructed if the two types of capital
producers can be further differentiated. Here I assume that it is feasible for some agents
to scale down the size of their business ventures so that even if they are rationed or
unfunded, they can produce a small amount of output using their own labor as an input in
the production process.2 Here I assume that Type-L project owners have this outside
opportunity, which entitles them to

-units of output. This opportunity is absent for

Type-H capital producers.3
In this economy, the arrangements which normally ensure that property rights are
well defined and enforced are absent to some degree. However, these arrangements,
whether formal or informal, are not exogenously given. Instead they evolve, driven by the
strength of private incentives to invest in property rights protection. This contrasts with
the orthodox view where property rights are an exogenous institution derived from a set
of initial conditions.
Though property rights are slack, I assume that an owner of property can protect a
fraction, , of her initial endowment and the associated income stream from predation by

2

It is necessary to assume that the value of this outside opportunity is small relative to the size of project
incomes so there are incentives for borrowers to undertake invests in the first place.
3
Strictly, it is only necessary to assume that outside opportunities available to owners of varying project
types differs. Thus,I could assume that Type-H project owners also have access to this opportunity which
entitles them to
units of output, where
. Here for notational convenience I have normalized
to zero.
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incurring a monetary and/or time cost in the amount of

. In practice, this cost can take

various forms, such as litigation costs or the costs of hiring private security firms, etc. In
addition, I assume that for given legal and institutional structures, the marginal cost of
protecting property, , increases with the number of people attempting to do so as it
increases. This assumption is quite reasonable as increases in the demand for security
increases the price paid for those services (e.g. legal services). To justify this assumption
further, I draw support from various legal statistics. Consider for instance a country such
as India, where in 1950, 1215 cases were filled in India’s Supreme Court. By 2008 that
number had increased to over 28,0004. This increase has led to an enormous backlog of
cases. As a result, the current courts system is so overstressed that the time-cost of
litigating is best measured in years and decades5 Similarly, there is evidence that in the
US justice system, increased legislative burden has been accompanied by a steadily rising
average monetary cost of litigation. In 1982, the combined expenditures (on legal
services) by local, state and federal governments amounted to $7 billion. By 2006, these
costs had risen to $46 billion. While there has been a steady increase in the number of
litigations, the percentage increase in litigation has been much smaller 6 in size resulting
in an increase in the average monetary cost of litigation.
2.2.2

Timing of decision making

The timing of events in our economy proceeds as follows. Prior to gaining access
to a project, agents choose a value of , i.e. they decide how much property they want to
safeguard from predation. Next agents are randomly and privately assigned a project,
4

For details, please refer to 229th Report of the Law commission of India 2009, Government of India.
Currently, writ petitions filed in higher courts of in India take an average of 8-10 years to be heard, while
the average duration of trials is 15 years (Chakravarti, Megginson, and Yadav, 2007).
6
Depending on the courts system, the percentage increase in litigation has varied between 30 and 150
percent (Annual and Federal Justice statistics, 2005).
5
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such that a fraction, , are assigned to Type-L projects and the remaining

are

assigned Type-H projects. Once projects are assigned, agents seek to operationalize these
ventures, by applying for loans from financial intermediaries who operate in a
competitive environment. The terms and conditions for these loans are influenced by the
volume of assets,

, in the possession of agents, which can be posted as collateral. In the

second period, projects generate incomes with which agents pay off loans and also
consume. The outcomes that transpire from these decisions are determined by solving
backwards through the sequence of events. In particular, I first determine how the loan
contract is influenced by the choice of . This information is then used in sub-sections 4
and 5 to pin down the optimal value of

for an individual and for the economy as a

whole.
2.2.3

Financial Contracts

In the first period, borrowers approach banks for loans to finance investments.
The idiosyncratic credit risk associated with each borrower is private information.
However, the aggregate ex ante distribution of project types, along with the associated
expected returns for each type of investment, and the outside opportunities faced by typeL versus type-H investors is common knowledge. In addition, when approaching banks,
loan applicants must reveal the value of their assets,
generated from those assets

, and the associated income

̂, both of which are costlessly verifiable by

financial intermediaries.
I suppose that banks incur a cost when contracting loan agreements. I denote this
cost by

. In practice, costs of financial intermediaries include the cost of providing
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liquidity services, agency costs, such as those associated with processing information,
enforcing contracts, and screening. I assume that these costs decline along the path of
financial development. There is certainly an empirical basis for this assumption. Two
empirical measures of intermediation costs are banks’ overhead expenditure as a
proportion of total assets and bank’s net interest rate margin. It is well documented that
both measures tend to be higher in less developed financial sectors (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt
and Huizinga 2000; Demigurc-Kunt et al. 2003). Accordingly, I interpret lower values of
as corresponding to improvements in the efficiency of the financial system and assume
the value of

to be known to the financial intermediaries.

Given the above information, a lender offers contracts to borrowers, the
acceptance of which implies a binding agreement committing the former to a transfer of
funds in the amount

to a borrower and the latter to a repayment of these funds from her

future project income. I assume that financial intermediaries operate in a competitive
environment and that the terms and conditions of loan contracts offered in the market is
common knowledge. Accordingly, loan-applicants will only approach financial
intermediaries if the contracts offered are not dominated by other contracts available in
the market for loanable funds. Thus, in equilibrium, banks earn zero profits.
I assume that the contract offered by a financial intermediary can be represented by a
pair:
and

for
[

denotes the gross real lending rate for a contract of type-

] is the probability that a type- borrower will be granted a loan. For this

contract, type- borrowers receive utility
for

and

, where

[

]

. The first term in this expression is the net

payoff from risky investments in the event a loan is granted and the project is successful.
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The second term is the payoff in the event that the project is not funded. It is easy to see that
since

, the indifference curves of the two types of borrowers satisfy single-crossing

property in the contract plane. This enables lenders to separate borrowers according to
their risk types by offering a menu of contracts that are individually rational and incentive
compatible.7 The following proposition fully describes these equilibrium contracts:
Proposition 1: Let denote the cost of funds for financial intermediaries. If
, the equilibrium separating contract for a given value of  is characterized by:
̂
̂

Proof: In competitive equilibrium, banks earn zero economic profit on contracts
for

̂

. This implies that

, for

. Here, the first

term on the left hand side is a financial intermediary’s expected interest earnings in the
absence of default, when the investment project is successful. The second term is the
expected amount a financial intermediary can recover by appropriating a borrower’s asset
if the project fails and the borrower defaults. The right hand side of the expression is
the cost of lending, which is comprised of the cost of acquiring funds,
intermediation, . The expression for
profit condition, where we assume

, for

, and the cost of

follows immediately from the zero

. Throughout the analysis, I assume that there is

risk associated with lending and therefore the condition

̂

must hold. This, in

turn, implies that RL < RH .

7

For a similar argument, see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), Bencivenga and Smith (1993), and Bose and
Cothren (1996).
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To obtain the expressions for
expected utility
utility of a type-

[

, for

note that agents of type-

] from their contracts

borrower from her contract

derive

, while the
is

[

]. Now consider a full information scenario where a lender is able to distinguish
between a type-L and a type-H borrower. In this case, under competition the offered
contracts will still earn zero profit for the lenders and also there is no need for a lender to
deny credit to a borrower. Let us denote these first best contracts as
and

for high and the low risk borrowers respectively.
,

and

Since,

. Therefore, in the presence of

information asymmetry, if first best contracts are offered, it is only the type-H agents who
has the incentive to misrepresent herself as being of type-

and and not vice-versa.

Accordingly, there is no need for financial intermediaries to distort the contract for the
type-

borrowers from their first best in order to induce self selection. Accordingly, even

in the case of informational asymmetry, typewhich is:

̂

[

]

borrowers receive their first best contract,
. The contract for the type-

group is then

determined by solving the following problem:
max U L (C L )  [ L (Q  RL ) x  (1   L ) L ]

(2)

 LR 

subject to the incentive compatibility constraint:
(2a)
where RL and RH are given by (1a). Given,

, it is easy to verify that the

incentive compatibility constraint (2a), must bind in equilibrium. By writing (2a) as an
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equality, and substituting in expressions for

and

I obtain an expression for

as

given in 1(b)
Proposition 1 implies that in equilibrium the separation of borrowers by type is achieved
–a result that is well-

by rationing credit to a fraction of low-risk borrowers,
known in the “adverse selection” literature. Also note that
and

 L
1
1

0

Qx  xr   pH

 L
(1  pH ) zˆ 1

0.

Qx  xr   pH

The intuition behind these results is straightforward. Higher values of

(better

protection of property) allow borrowers to post more collateral. This reduces lending risk
and the interest rate financial intermediaries charge to both high and low risk borrowers.
A similar effect transpires when the cost of intermediation,
however, the decline in RH is more than the decline in RL since
the contract

, falls. In both cases,
. This, makes

less attractive to high-risk capital producers and provides banks with an

opportunity to lower the incidence of credit rationing (i.e. increase the value of

) while

maintaining the incentive compatibility condition. Accordingly the financial sector will
supply more credit in more financially mature markets and/or in countries with a strong
system of property rights.
2.2.4

An Individual’s decision when (the cost of protecting property) is
exogenous

The analysis in the previous section traces a link bet

en financial contracts and

the value of , i.e. the extent to which indi duals protect property. Higher values of
allow individual’s to post more collateral when applying for loans, thus improving the
terms and conditions of loan contracts. However the safeguarding property against
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encroachment entail a cost,

roportional to the value

. Solving for

involves

optimizing this trade-off. The agent solves this problem with knowledge of the contracts
and knowledge of the ex-ante probability distribution which determines his chance of
being endowed with a project of type-

or type- , but not knowing what draw she will

receive from this distribution ex post. Accordingly, the agent’s problem is to maximize
the following objective function:
(̃)

⏟

(̃)

,

(3)

where, ̃ and ̃ denote a borrower’s life-time income if the borrower is endowed with
project H or L, respectively.
Proposition 2: Let

and

denote the maximum and the minimum attainable

levels of property rights. Further, define
optimally choose

if

)

. An agent will

and

if

.

Proof: The expected life-time payoffs to a type-L project is given by the expression,
̃

̂]

[

̂

. The first term in this expression is the

net payoff from the risky project in the event the loan is granted and the project is
successful. The second term represents the payoff in the event the project is not funded.
This term includes both asset incomes,

̂ , and income from the outside opportunity,

The equivalent expression for a type-H borrower is given by ̃
̂ ], where I assume
and

,

[

. Using these expressions along with the expressions for

, from (1a) and (1b), it follows from equation (3) that

Accordingly, an agent should set
respectively

.

and

when

.
and

,
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These results are easy to interpret. A higher
welfare loss. The term

implies both a welfare gain and a

represents the marginal benefit of improving property

rights. This includes the welfare gain which follows from the reduction in credit risk and
the consequent improvement in the terms and conditions of loan contracts. Whereas,
represents the marginal costs associated with property rights improvement. Depending on
which is greater, the agent sets

at either its maximum or minimum value.

In presenting these results I have focused on one parameter-financial intermediation, Note in particular that

—the cost of

. This follows since a lower

costs of financial intermediation improve the terms and conditions of loan contracts, such
that agents receive higher marginal benefit from putting up their future income as
collateral. Accordingly, the marginal benefit to an agent of securing higher property
rights is greater the lower this cost.
2.2.5

Endogenous and Economy wide Outcomes

The results obtained above

haracterize the precise conditions under which an

individual will seek to protect her property. This condition depend on two economy wide
variables—

and . For the purposes of this chapter, I treat

as exogenous since our

principal focus is on the role of financial development in influencing the quality of
property rights. However, keeping in line with the stylized facts presented earlier, I treat
the cost of enforcing property rights as an endogenous outcome dictated by the aggregate
behavior of individuals. In particular, I postulate that the marginal cost of protecting
property, , increases with the number of people protecting their property. Formally, I
assume that

and

, where

[

] denotes the fraction of agents that

enforce their property right to the fullest extent, i.e., set

.
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The present framework outlines a scenario where the cost of enforcing property
rights not only influences the behavior of individuals, but also their behavior in
aggregate. Clearly, such a scenario raises the possibility of a variety of equilibria, each of
which is characterized by different levels of property rights. Significantly, the following
proposition demonstrates how the equilibrium choice varies when

takes a value from

high to low indicating a transition from low to high levels of financial development.
Proposition 3:
(i)

There e

al level of financial development,

, such that when

the equilibrium in the economy is characterized by a unique behavior
profile where all agents set
(ii)

There exists

such that

increases monotonically when
Proof: I begin by defining

.
the fraction of agents who set
decreases in the interval
and

. Evidently,

. Further define, δ = δ1 such that
Since,


 0 and since


Suppose that

, I have

and

for

such that

, since
.

(Please refer to figure 2.1).

, and consider a behavior profile where all agents set

. Accordingly,    0 .Since, by definition,
that

.

, and


 0 , it follows


. Therefore, from proposition 2, no individual agent has an

incentive to deviate from this behavior profile. This is a unique equilibrium. To see this
consider the behavior profile at the other extreme, i.e. when all agents set
Accordingly,

and

.

. In this case, from an individual agent’s
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standpoint it is optimal to deviate and set

and therefore the aggregate

equilibrium outcome cannot be supported by the behavior profile
Now suppose,

, and consider the pure strategy behavior profile where

for all agents. In this case,

. Therefore it is optimal for an

agent to deviate from her behavior profile and set
is easy to see that

.

. Using a similar argument it

cannot also be an equilibrium since

. There exists

however an equilibrium supported by a mixed-strategy profile. To see this, consider
. Since ( )  0 ,
strategy where

. Now, consider a mixed–

fraction of agents set

assumes value

and the rest set

which lies between

development,

, the value of

such that

. Since, ( b )  ( a ) and
in the interval

. For a given level of financial

that solves

profile as an equilibrium where only
consider another

and

, so that

supports a mixed behavior

fraction of agents choose
and

. Finally,

Suppose that

, it follows that

solves

. Accordingly,
increases as 

, the fraction of agents choosing

decreases
To see the intuition underlying proposition 3, note that by choosing to protect
property, agents receive the added benefit of improved lending terms. The extent of these
benefits however is contingent upon the level of financial development. If

, this

benefit from protecting property is so low that that it is optimal for an agent to choose
even if she is facing the lowest cost of enforcement,
interval

. As

decreases in the

, the marginal benefit from protecting property increases and creates
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incentives for individuals to enforce property rights. At the same time, an increase in the
number of individuals choosing to protect property increases the cost of property rights
enforcement. The benefit arising from a fall in

compensates this increasing marginal

cost and accommodates more individuals to take initiatives towards stronger property
rights enforcement. Accordingly, a higher level of financial development gives rise to an
environment that is suitable for a better property rights institution.
2.3 Conclusion:
This essay provides a theoretical model to explore association between finance
and property rights. The argument is simple: enforcing property rights is costly. However
stronger property rights enable borrowers to improve the terms of their financial contracts
by posting collateral. This marginal benefit to securing property increases as financial
markets mature and the costs of intermediation decline. Thus incentives for individuals
and society to incur the necessary costs of better enforcing property rights rise. In spite of
its simplicity, the model produces a rich variety of outcomes as a result of a mutual
interaction between individual decision making and aggregate behavior. In particular, I
am able to distinguish between two types of financial development regimes. In a low
quality regime the effect of finance on the development of property rights is weak.
However, when financial development crosses a certain threshold, further reductions in
the cost of financial intermediation catalyze institutional reforms that better secure
property.
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Figure 2.1 Multiple Equilibria
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Chapter 3: Threshold Effects of finance on property rights

3.1 Introduction
There is a wide consensus that institutions of property rights tend to be persistent
and evolve from a cluster of initial conditions. However in the previous section it was
established that they do indeed change over time owing to changes in some proximate
factors and one of the factors that contributes to the reforms in institutions of property
rights is financial development. I established that by developing a simple model of
financial intermediation with incomplete information. The theory produced a straightforward testable implication that the relationship between finance and property rights is
nonlinear: stronger financial markets can catalyze positive institutional reforms, but only
after financial markets have crossed into an intermediate range of development. This
essay provides formal empirical evidence in favor of the nonlinear association between
finance and property rights.
A first look at data on property rights and a measure of financial development—
the volume of credit allocated to the private sector by financial intermediaries—suggests a
pattern of co-movement that is consistent with these predictions. In Figure 3.1 chart an
index of property rights (constructed by Fraser Institute) over five year intervals from
1970 to 2005 along with the average volume of private credit to GDP in the five preceding
years. I divide our data into two equal sized groups, one composed of countries where the
volume of private credit is less than 30 percent of GDP and the other composed of
countries where private credit exceeded this 30 percent cut point. In each case, I plot for
each time period, the median levels of finance and property rights across the countries in

30
our sample. In the low finance group the volume of private credit and property rights do
not appear to commove, whereas in the high finance group, they do.
I begin by examining the evidence on nonlinearities in the relationship between
property rights and finance. In particular, I test for a threshold in this relationship in a
cross-section of over 100 countries using a procedure suggested in Hansen (1996; 2000).
Consistent with our theory, our results suggest two distinct regimes. One in which the
quality of financial systems is poor, and where its effect on property rights is weak, and
one where the practice of banking has evolved beyond a certain point, such that further
improvements in access to credit are positively associated with the degree to which
countries enforce property rights.
After establishing the existence of a threshold, I separately analyze the
determinants of property rights for observations in the low and high finance regimes in a
panel composed of up to 116 countries. The panel GMM analysis confirms earlier finding
within the cross-section that the effect of finance on property law varies across low and
high finance regimes, while enabling us to make some structural inferences.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section two, describes data
and briefly outlines the empirical methodology. In section three, I present the results.
Finally section four concludes with some remarks.
3.2 Data and Methodology:
3.2.1

Outline of the Methodology:
The first set of evidence I present tests for possible nonlinearity in the form of a

threshold effects in the finance-property rights relationship. The approach is based on
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recent statistical innovations that provide a basis for testing non-nested hypotheses where
parameters are unidentified under the null (Hansen, 1996; Hansen, 2000). In particular, I
estimate variations of the following regression:

[

]

[

]

.

(1)

The above specification allows the association between financial development,
, and property rights,

, in country

to vary with

.In particular observations are

divided into two regimes depending on whether the threshold variable, financial
development, is smaller or larger than the threshold . The indicator function
allows the slope coefficients on financial development to vary across the two regimes.
The unknown threshold is estimated by minimizing a loss function across values
of

(see Hansen, 1996; 2000 for details). Testing the assertion that there are distinct

regimes across which finance has markedly differing effects on the enforcement of
property rights amounts to testing a hypothesis about . Since is not identified under the
null hypothesis (“no threshold”), the asymptotic distribution of classical test statistics is
not chi-squared. This is problem has been investigated in Hansen (1996) who suggests a
test based on difference between the sum of squared errors under the null,
alternatives,

̂ , i.e.

̂
̂ ⁄

. The distribution of

, and

is non-standard and depends

on nuisance parameters. Hansen (1996) however shows that a bootstrap procedure can
approximate this distribution, so p-values based on simulation are asymptotically valid.
Evidence of threshold effects and nonlinearities may be suggestive however they
are not a basis from which I can make structural inferences. The difficulty is that
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financial development is endogenous. In addressing this issue I face a hurdle.
Instrumental variables estimation within endogenous threshold models is difficult.
Estimation methods are available only with certain restrictions (Caner and Hansen,
2004).
Here I present a second set of evidence where I take an alternative approach. I
attempt to resolve the issue of identification within a panel framework using the
Arellano-Bover system GMM estimator. I link our panel analysis to the earlier analysis of
thresholds, by splitting the data into two sub-samples based on the previously generated
threshold estimates. Thus I estimate two sets of panel regressions; one for the low finance
group for which

̂ and one for the high finance group where

̂ . The

conjecture is that financial development will have little effect on the degree to which
governments enforce property rights in countries where financial markets are
underdeveloped to begin with. Thus the size of the coefficient on the finance variable in
subsample of panel regressions where

̂ should be small and may be statistically

insignificant. By contrast, in countries where financial market development has crossed a
threshold, further advancements in the financial sector should encourage stronger
property rights legislation and enforcement. Thus for the sample where

̂ , I would

expect to isolate a strong positive relationship between financial development and
property rights within countries over time.
3.2.2

Data on property rights and finance:

Measuring Property Rights:
Measures of property rights-enforcement fall into two classes. One class aims to
capture the security of intangible assets—specifically intellectual property. Another

33
class provides an assessment of the scope of laws and regulations governing the
security of property as they apply more generally. Since our focus is not exclusively
on intellectual property, it makes sense to draw from this latter group. Our primary
measure of property rights is an index assembled by James Gwartney and Robert
Lawson and published by the Fraser Institute (with the Cato Institute as its US
partner) in their Economic Freedom of the World: 2009 Annual Report.
An important feature of the index is that it does not simply reflect laws on the
books, but also the overall legal environment as it relates to the protection of property
rights and the overall quality of legal institutions. Countries are rated on a scale from
0 to 10—zero being the lowest—on the degree to which the judiciary is independent
and free of government interference, on the impartiality of the courts, on the basis of
the protection of property, the degree of military interference, the integrity of the
legal system, and the degree of enforcement of legal contracts and the extent of
regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property.
The large cross-country dimension of the Fraser Institute’s data (141 countries) is
useful since our intent here is to identify complex, potentially nonlinear, relationships.
Unfortunately drawing structural inferences from cross-country analyses is difficult.
Fortunately, these data also offer a time dimension. They are available for a 37-year
period from 1970 to 2007. Between 1970 and 2000 these data were reported at fiveyear intervals, since 2000 however these data are published at an annual frequency.
The time-series component of these data provides a basis for resolving the
identification issue within a panel framework, while also allowing us to control for
country-specific effects.

34
While the presumption is that the bulk of variation in property rights is across
countries, this is not in fact the case. In fact the within-variation over time in the
Fraser Institute’s measure is almost as large as the between-variation across countries
(Table 3.1). Even though the median country rating has changed very little, increasing
from 6.25 in 1970 to 6.7 in 2005 (the average rating also changed only slightly from
6.1 to 6.6), in some countries the extent of enforcement of property rights has
changed substantially. In Chile, for instance, under Pinochet property rights were
strengthened. This respect for contractual agreements continued even in the aftermath
of that regime. As a result between 1970 and 2005, Chile’s property rights rating
increased by 4.11 points. By contrast Venezuela, which has introduced various land
reforms, has seen its property rights rating drop by 2.16 points since 1970.
An alternative measure of property rights is the rating published by the Heritage
Foundation. These data have been used extensively in the literature (La Porta et al.,
1999; 2002; Acemoglu et. al., 2001; Claessens and Laeven, 2003). This measure
provides an assessment of individuals’ abilities to accumulate private property, which
is secured by transparent legislation and government enforcement, together with the
likelihood of expropriation, the efficiency of the judiciary, the presence of corruption
within the judiciary and the enforceability of contracts. Countries are rated on a scale
from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating stronger property rights. For our
purposes, it is useful to rescale these data from 0 to 10.
Although these data are available for a large cross-section, their time series
dimension is short; ratings on property rights are available on an annual basis starting
in 1995, making these data less than ideal for panel analysis. In the sensitivity section
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below I consider robustness exercises that focus specifically on the cross-country
dimension of these data.
Measures of Financial Development:
The World Bank’s Financial Structure Database provides data on a wide array of
country-level financial indicators. Of these, measures of the size of the financial
system continue to be the most widely used proxy for efficiency of financial markets.
Research has focused in particular on the volume of credit supplied by the financial
system to the private sector (normalized by GDP). The intuition underlying this
measure is straightforward: financial systems that allocate more credit to the private
sector are likely to monitor firms more closely and exercise greater corporate control
(Beck et al., 2000). The bulk of our data analysis is based on this indicator. However,
in some sensitivity exercises, I also consider two alternative measures of financial
depth—the sum of currency, demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and
other financial intermediaries (normalized by GDP); and the ratio of commercial bank
assets to the sum of commercial and central bank assets. Both of these measures have
also been used extensively in empirical financial research (see Beck et al., 2000 for
details).
3.3 Results:
3.3.1

An Initial Look at the Data
In this section, I provide evidence on the relation between finance and property

rights. I present this in stages. I begin by regressing property rights against the logarithm
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of finance8 and a set of other controls. I do not fully parameterize this relationship.
Instead I estimate a partially linear additive model (Stone, 1985), where the finance
variable enters the equation additively, but is estimated using univariate smoothers, so
our regression equation takes the following form:
,
here

(2)

is the average of the Fraser Institute’s property rights rating in country over the

sample period—from 1970 to 2005—and

is the average volume of private credit to

GDP (over the same period).
At this stage I keep our specification simple. In particular,

is composed of a

dummy for British legal origin, a country’s latitude and ethnic fractionalization. This
specification will form the baseline model like chapter one and is motivated by three
predominant views on historical determinants of property rights. This specification will
form our baseline model and with the exception of a dummy for Catholicism, which I
include later, the specification is identical to that considered by Ayyagari, DemirgüçKunt and Maksimovic (2006). Though parsimonious, this specification is motivated by
three predominant views on historical determinants of property rights.
The first of these argues that differences in legal traditions influenced how
property rights evolved (Hayek, 1960; La Porta et. al., 1998). Proponents of this view
draw sharp distinctions between civil law and common law. Under British common law,
emphasis falls on the rights of individuals to ownership and not on the rights of the state.
Moreover, unlike the French (and German) civil code, common law does not limit
jurisprudence, which has allowed laws to adapt more efficiently to changing contractual
8

The distribution of data on the volume of private credit as well as other measures of the size of financial
sectors are typically positively skewed, as such it is typical to transform these data by taking logarithms.
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needs.
By contrast Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001; 2002) argue that what
matters is not the identity of the colonial power, but rather their proclivity to establish
institutions. In inhospitable environments, Europeans introduced extractive institutions,
which did not protect the property rights of individuals. Often these were countries close
to the equator with tropical climates and a high incidence of disease. Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson (2001; 2002) argue using mortality rates amongst European colonists as an
exogenous determinant of property rights. Here I use latitude instead in our baseline
specification, as data on the latter are only available for a significantly smaller set of
countries.
A third view links ethnic composition to the development of property rights.
Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that ruling classes in ethnically diverse countries
attempt to expropriate resources from other ethnic factions. Thus these economies also
tend to have weaker institutions.
While the additive model in (2) does not provide a basis for testing for threshold
effects, its flexibility provides an important exploratory foundation which may reveal
nonlinearities in the relationship between property rights and finance. Of interest is the
pattern of variation of the smoother

. In particular, here I am interested whether this

variation suggests an approximate classification of observations into distinct regimes.
A plot of the nonparametric smoother,

, is presented in Figure 3.2. The plot

provides some evidence of nonlinear structure in the relationship between property rights
and finance. In particular, the nonparametric smooth

appears approximately kinked

when the volume of private credit is roughly between 20 and 22 percent of GDP.
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Although this evidence does not provide a formal basis for rejecting linearity, it is
suggestive. The ratio of private credit averaged less than 22 percent of GDP in
approximately 35 percent of the countries in the sample. Within that group the
association between private credit to GDP and property rights is essentially zero. In the
complementary sub-sample, this association is strongly positive.
Below I present evidence which formally tests for the presence of threshold
effects in the relationship between finance and property rights.
3.3.2

Threshold Regressions
In this section I apply methods developed in Hansen (1996; 2000), to split the

data into two groups, based on the measure of financial development. To this end I
augment and then estimate equation (4), using additional regressors, beginning with the
baseline specification. I then extend this baseline in various ways.
First, I build on the endowment theory of property rights by including a measure
of mortality rates amongst early European settlers (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson,
2001). Next, I consider the importance of religious identity—Catholicism in particular—
as a historical determinant of property rights. The argument here is that Catholicism is
associated with societies where bonds between the church and state limited the
development of property rights (Putnam, 1993; Landes, 1998; Stulz & Williamson,
2003).
In the third specification, I examine the importance of political factors in shaping
the rights to ownership in countries. North and Weingast (1989) argue that constraints on
governments’ abilities to abrogate individuals rights to ownership are associated with
stronger property rights. Thus I introduce a control for constraints on the executive.
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Finally, I consider the role of economic influences on property rights, by
extending the specification to include real per capita income, as well as trade and
financial openness. Gradstein (2004) argues that higher real per-capita incomes are
associated with stronger property rights, since higher incomes relate to abilities of
governments to invest in institutional development. Income may matter also for the
development of intellectual property rights (Maskus, 2000). Others have argued that
greater openness disciplines governments and begets better institutions (Wei, 2000). This
view has been extended to include financial globalization (Stulz, 2004). The argument
here is that greater capital mobility weakens the ability of states to expropriate, by
providing domestic investors with opportunities to channel funds abroad.
I estimate two versions of equation (1). First I estimate the following model:

[

]

[

i.e. I augment (1) using additional regressors,

]

,

(3a)

, but constrain the slope coefficients on

these variables to be the same across the two regimes. In the case, where
uncorrelated, constraining the coefficients on

and

are

will not bias the test, while at the same

time centering attention on the finance variable. Thus any evidence of a threshold is
based solely on the additional explanatory power provided when I allow the effect of
finance to change across regimes. Unfortunately, in general

and

uncorrelated, and the coefficients on our other explanatory variables,
switch across regimes. Restricting the model coefficients on
bias in estimates of

and

will not be
, could also

could therefore impart a

. If this bias is not uniform across regimes, and there is no

reason to think why it would be, then our test may erroneously point to a threshold when
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none are present. Thus, in addition to the restricted model (3a), I also consider the case
where the model parameters on each of our controls are allowed to vary freely across
regimes, i.e. I estimate the following specification:

[

]

[

]

.

(3b)

The results from these exercises are arranged across two panels in Table 3.2. The
dependent variable is the average of the Fraser Institute index from 1970 to 2005. In
Panel A, I allow the coefficient on the intercept and finance variables only to change
across regimes, i.e. I impose cross-regime restrictions on our additional controls. In Panel
B, I estimate a model without imposing cross-regime restrictions. To save space, in Panel
B I only report the coefficients on the finance variable.
I find strong evidence in favor of a split (based on finance) in every model
specification when I impose cross-regime restrictions on our other model parameters
(Table 3.2, Panel A). In each case, I can reject the null of linearity at one percent or
better. The strength of this evidence reflects large differences in the effect of finance on
property rights. In the low regime, the coefficient on finance is 0.023 and statistically
insignificant. In the high finance regime, the coefficient on finance increases to 1.315
with a t-statistic larger than 4.5.
In the baseline specification, the regimes split when the volume of credit to the
private sector is about 32 percent [=exp(3.49)-1] of GDP. As such approximately 57
percent of the countries lie in the low finance regime. Across the specifications, the range
of variation in the threshold parameter is between 22 [=exp(3.13)-1] and 36 percent
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[=exp(3.60)-1] of GDP. The size of the coefficient on finance also varies across
specifications however importantly in the low regime the effect of finance is not
statistically different from zero in four of the five model specifications. In the one case
where its effect is statistically significant, the coefficient is negative. By contrast in high
finance regimes, the coefficient on finance is always positive and strongly statistically
significant.
The results are qualitatively similar when I relax cross-regime restrictions. In
most cases, the finance threshold occurs at roughly the median level of private credit
ratios—between 31 and 32 percent of GDP. Moreover, evidence of a split is strong.
Importantly also the pattern of variation in the effect of finance across regimes is both
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to our results based on cross-regime restrictions,
except perhaps when I control for European settler mortality rates, which significantly
shrinks our sample.
The coefficients on some of other control variables are consistent with earlier
research. For instance I find that countries further from the equator tend to have stronger
property rights. There is strong support also for the view that British legal traditions have
positively influenced the development of property rights. On average countries with
British legal traditions scored between 0.54 and 0.714 points higher on the 10-point
Fraser scale (Table 3.2, Panel A). Thus while the relationship between British legal
traditions and the development of property rights may be statistically important,
quantitatively its effect is small. Consistent also with earlier evidence I find that countries
with high mortality rates amongst European colonists developed weaker property rights
institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; 2002). The log of European settler
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mortality rates varies between a low of 2.15 in Australia, which receives a property rating
of 8.32, and a high of 7.99 in Mali, which receives a score of 4.41. Based on my
estimates, I can attribute about a third of this difference to the variation in settler
mortality rates. By contrast the effect of political constraints is quantitatively more
significant. On average, countries with strong constraints on the chief executive receive a
score that is approximately 3 points higher on the Fraser index.
I find also that higher incomes and increased trade openness are associated with
stronger enforcement of property rights (Table 3.2, Panel A, column 5b), although the
effect of trade openness is not statistically significant. Increased financial globalization
by contrast is associated with weaker property rights, which is the opposite of what I
might expect, although this effect is insignificant.
While the evidence of thresholds is consistent with our claim of nonlinearity, it is
also open to alternative interpretations. At issue is the proximate determinant of the
nonlinearity in the finance-property rights relationship. Does this relationship hinge on
the level of financial development, or is it the case that countries with weaker financial
markets are also less developed, where in general, the quality of data is worse, and
relationships appear weaker? That is, is the relevant threshold variable finance, or is it
income?
Choosing between these correlated alternatives is difficult. Evidence of linearity
is easily rejected in favor of income-based thresholds [Table 3.3, columns (1a) and (1b)
and (2a) and (2b)]. The estimated cut point varies. In a specification with cross-regime
restrictions, it is $1,188. When I relax these coefficient restrictions it is $2,540. Yet while
specification matters for the composition of low- and high-income groups, the effect of
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finance on property rights is not very sensitive to this variation in cut points. In the lowincome regime the coefficient on finance is 0.30 and statistically insignificant and in the
high regime it varies between 1.22 and 1.26. Both qualitatively and quantitatively these
coefficients are similar to those reported in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, columns (3a) and
(3b) and(4a) and (4b), where I use the same specification, but allow finance to be the
threshold variable.
Based on this evidence it is not clear whether the threshold variable is finance or
income. At the same time it is not immediately obvious how I might jointly test for
linearity versus each of these alternatives. Here I consider a two- step approach. In the
first step, I separately estimate the cut points in finance, ̂ , and income ̂ . These
estimates are obtained from the constrained and unconstrained threshold regressions
reported in Table 3.3. In the second step, I assume these thresholds are known, estimate
the following regression:

[ (

̂ )]

[ (

̂ )]

and then test for the statistical significance of the parameters
(

and

. The function

̂ ) is a dummy for countries in the high finance regime and (

̂ ) is a

dummy for countries with per-capita incomes greater than ̂ . This specification allows
the effect of finance to shift as financial credit and income cross their respective critical
values ̂ and ̂ .
Although this approach is somewhat ad hoc, that the coefficient on the interaction
between finance and high-income countries,

, is either not statistically significant or is
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negative [Table 3.4A, columns (1) and (2) and Table 2.4B] is suggestive. Thus either
income has no effect on the finance-property rights relationship, as our results in column
(2) of Table 2.4A suggest, or it does, but only for very low income countries, and in the
opposite direction. By contrast the effect of finance does appear to increase when the
volume of credit exceeds a critical threshold ̂ . There is a then a tentative basis for
attributing the nonlinearity observed in Table 2.3 to financial development rather than
income.
However, importantly a “kink” in the finance-property rights relationship is not
by itself direct evidence in support of causality, as within each regime the direction of
causality could be running from property rights to stronger financial market development.
Thus establishing the fact that finance “causes” a change in property rights in nonlinear
fashion would require dealing with identification issues in the panel frame work.
3.3.3

Panel Regressions
Since it is difficult to isolate the structural component in the relationship between

property rights and finance in the cross-section, I attempt to generate some traction on
this issue by exploiting the time-series variation in the Fraser Institute’s data. In
particular, I re-estimate the property rights-finance relationship in a panel, using as
instruments, lags of the endogenous regressors. I use the system-GMM estimator
(Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) and the justification of use of the
approach is same as chapter one , i.e. it is well suited for persistent macroeconomic data.
The property rights equation no longer includes country-specific effects. Hence
the baseline is simply a regression of property rights in one of eight time periods
, against the average private credit to GDP ratio in the each of five
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preceding years. In addition, I extend this specification by first including controls for
partisanship and then for initial period real per-capita income, trade and financial
openness. Since my goal is to examine how the effect of finance on property rights
changes across regimes, I split our data into two subsamples using our earlier threshold
estimate (private credit

percent of GDP) and estimate the relationship between

property rights and finance within each subsample.
As a benchmark I begin by estimating this relationship for the full sample of
countries, using fixed effects as well as the system GMM procedure. Based on these
findings, it is evident that financial development is strongly correlated with stronger
property rights over time (Table 3.5, column 1). Thus while institutional change
sometimes occurs slowly, there is enough time variation in the measure of property rights
with which I can identify a statistically meaningful relationship with financial
development. The second-order serial correlation in the residuals of property rights
regression should be absent, and the results suggest that they are (Table 2.5, column 2).
There is therefore a tentative basis from which I might conclude that stronger
financial markets lay the groundwork for stronger property law. But does this relationship
change depending on the level of financial development as our theory predicts? To
examine this issue, I split our data into low and high finance regimes and re-estimate our
property rights equation in each sub-sample. Across these sub-samples there are sharp
differences in the effect of finance on property rights. In the low regime the coefficient on
finance ranges between 0.02 and 0.2. In the high regime this range of variation is between
1.5 and 2.0 and the coefficients are highly statistically significant. In each of the
specifications, in each sub-sample, second order serial correlation is absent and our
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results also pass the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions.
These results suggest that increases in the volume of credit supplied by the
banking sector did not bring forth stronger property rights in countries where the quality
of finance was generally low. However, where financial conditions were moderately
strong to begin with, improvements in the contracting environment paved the way for
stronger property rights.
3.3.4

Robustness
Although the findings hold in samples differing in country-coverage and

specification, questions related to robustness remain. A particularly important criticism is
that two key variables—the quality of financial intermediation services and the quality of
institutions—are measured with error. Since neither is observed directly, there is little
scope for addressing this criticism in a completely satisfactory manner, however at a
minimum I might insist that the results are robust across viable alternatives.
In Table 3.6, I provide additional evidence of nonlinearities in the financeproperty rights relationship. The results are arranged in panels. In Panel A, I continue to
measure financial development using the logarithm of the volume of credit provided to
the private sector, however in addition to Fraser Institute data; I also consider the index of
property rights published by the Heritage Foundation. In Panels B and C, I vary the
measure of financial development. In particular, I consider the log of the ratio of liquid
liabilities to GDP, as well as the log of the ratio of commercial bank assets to total banks
assets. In each case, the relevant specification is the baseline, with and without crossregime restrictions. The cells are shaded such that darker cells correspond to instances
when the threshold is statistically significant, the effect of finance is statistically
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indistinguishable from zero in the low regime and positive and statistically significant in
the high regime. Cells receiving a lighter shade satisfy two of these criteria.
The results point to strong evidence of a nonlinear relationship between property
rights and finance when the latter is measured as the logarithm of the volume credit
provided to the private sector. The threshold level of finance consistently splits the
sample within the 55th to 60th percentile range. Moreover the coefficients on finance in
the low and high regimes are of similar across the different measures of property rights.
Similar nonlinearities are evident when banking development is assessed on the basis of
the relative volume of commercial bank assets. In these cases the coefficient on finance is
an order of magnitude larger in part because the splits occur at higher values of our
threshold variable, and in part because property rights are highly responsive to increases
in banking development in the high finance regime. For instance, in column (2) of Panel
C, the coefficient on finance increases from 0.66 to 7.96 as the percent share of
commercial bank assets increases beyond 85 percent of total bank assets. A ten percent
increase in this measure will therefore increase a country’s rating on the Fraser Institute
scale by 0.9 points.
Although the liquid liabilities of the financial sector are strongly correlated with
the volume of credit allocated to the private sector (0.85), evidence of thresholds is
weaker in this case. Even so the evidence is suggestive. The simulated p-values in our
regressions are borderline significant. Moreover, the effect of finance in the high regime
increases from zero to positive and significant in all cases but one.
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3.4 Conclusion
Existing literature offers evidence suggesting that the cross-country variation in
property rights can account for much of the international variation in the development of
financial markets. In this chapter I have put forward empirical evidence and produce a
rich variety of outcomes and have been able to distinguish between two types of financial
development regimes. In a low quality regime the effect of finance on the development of
property rights is weak. However, when financial development crosses a certain
threshold, further development in finance catalyzes institutional reforms that better secure
property.
I examine the relationship between finance and property rights in a cross-section
of over 100 countries. The results are consistent with nonlinearities in this relationship. In
particular, I find that when the ratio of private credit to GDP is below 32 percent, its
association with measures of property rights enforcement is weak. Above this threshold
the relationship between these two variables is strong. Further using data on a panel of
countries spanning 35 years, I show that the exogenous component in financial
development helps predict stronger property rights in countries where credit allocation to
the private sector has exceeded the 32 percent threshold.
The results presented in this chapter may also be viewed within the broader
context of potential linkages between the real and the financial sector of an economy.
Over the past decade a substantial body of research has attempted to identify channels
through which financial markets shape growth prospects in countries. There is a general
consensus that financial development is conducive to growth because it mobilizes savings
for investments, creates an opportunity to pool risks, improves the allocative efficiency,
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and lowers transaction costs. In this chapter I point to another, quite different, channel
through which financial development may foster economic performance—namely, by
creating incentives for countries to strengthen their property rights.
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Table 3.1 Within and Between Country Variation in Property Rights
Overall
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum

Between
5.96
1.18
2.30
9.08

0.90
3.49
8.58

Within
0.73
3.45
8.13

Notes: Number of observations = 840, number of countries = 141, average number of observations per
country = 5.96.
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TABLE 3.2: Results from Threshold Regressions
Threshold Regressions
Panel A: Average Property Rights, 1970 to 2005. Cross Regime Restrictions
(1a)
(1b)
(2a)
(2b)
(3a)
(3b)
(4a)
(4b)
(5a)
(5b)
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime:
Finance ≤ Finance > Finance ≤ Finance > Finance ≤ Finance > Finance ≤ Finance > Finance ≤ Finance >
3.49
3.49
3.6
3.6
3.13
3.13
3.49
3.49
3.49
3.49
Finance
0.023 1.315***
-0.03 1.545***
0.376 1.945*** -0.552** 1.007***
-0.305 1.087***
(0.16)
(0.29)
(0.25)
(0.59)
(0.30)
(0.31)
(0.25)
(0.27)
(0.21)
(0.29)
Ethnic Fractionlization
0.002
0.004
-0.002
-0.001
0.004
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Latitude
0.042***
0.017
0.047***
0.04***
0.041***
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
UK Legal Origin
0.572***
0.714***
0.54***
0.6***
(0.19)
(0.27)
(0.20)
(0.20)
Settler Mortality
-0.221*
(0.13)
Catholic Countries
0.077
(0.22)
Constraints on the Executive
2.917***
(0.68)
Income
0.301**
(0.13)
Trade Openness
0.317
(0.25)
Financial Integration
-0.019
(0.21)
Number of Countries in Regime
58
43
43
14
19
48
44
37
52
40
p-value
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Panel B: Average Property Rights, 1970 to 2005. No Cross Regime Restrictions
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime:
Finance ≤ Finance > Finance ≤ Finance > Finance ≤ Finance > Finance ≤ Finance > Finance ≤ Finance >
3.49
3.49
3.47
3.47
3.49
3.49
3.49
3.49
3.49
3.49
Finance
0.181 1.097***
0.161
0.72
0.12 1.289***
-0.264 0.681***
-0.009 0.894***
(0.15)
(0.29)
(0.21)
(0.46)
(0.22)
(0.31)
(0.23)
(0.23)
(0.21)
(0.24)
Number of Countries in Regime
58
43
40
17
32
35
44
37
52
40
p-value
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.00)

Notes: standard errors and p-values associated with linearity test reported in parentheses. Statistical
significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent marked with *, **, ***, respectively. The dependent variable is the
average of the Fraser Institute’s property rights rating from 1970 to 2005. Financial development, trade
openness and financial integration are averages of each over this sample period. In each case I take a log
transformation of those data, except for finance where I take the following alternative transformation:
log(1+finance). The log of income and constraints on the executive are the initial 1970 values. All other
variables are country-specific. In each regression the log of financial development measure serves as the
threshold variable. Estimation was performed in Gauss using a code adapted from Hansen (2000).
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TABLE 3.3 :Income as a Threshold Variable
Threshold Regressions
Dependent Variable: Average Property Rights, 1970 to 2005
Income Thresholds
Finance Thresholds
Cross Regime Restrictions
Unrestricted
Cross Regime Restrictions
Unrestricted
(1a)
(1b)
(2a)
(2b)
(3a)
(3b)
(4a)
(4b)
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Regime:
Regime:
Regime:
Regime:
Regime:
Regime:
Regime:
Regime:
Income ≤
Income >
Income ≤
Income >
Finance ≤ Finance > Finance ≤ Finance >
7.08
7.08
7.84
7.84
3.49
3.49
3.49
3.49
Finance
0.3
1.226***
0.302
1.255***
-0.25
1.146***
0.012
0.952***
(0.29)
(0.18)
(0.19)
(0.22)
(0.21)
(0.28)
(0.19)
(0.26)
Ethnic Fractionlization
0.001
0.008**
-0.001
0.004
0.004
0
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
Latitude
0.035***
0.026
0.037***
0.037***
0.015
0.044***
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
UK Legal Origin
0.636***
0.756***
0.611***
0.638***
0.614**
0.8***
(0.19)
(0.29)
(0.24)
(0.21)
(0.27)
(0.28)
Income
0.555***
-0.37*
0.606**
0.293**
0.083
0.497*
(0.16)
(0.21)
(0.26)
(0.13)
(0.13)
(0.26)
Number of Countries in Regime
19
73
36
56
44
37
44
37
p-value
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.00)

Notes: standard errors and p-values associated with linearity test reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at
10, 5 and 1 percent marked with *, **, ***, respectively. The dependent variable is the average of the Fraser
Institute’s property rights rating from 1970 to 2005. Financial development is also averaged over the sample period
and transformed as follows: log(1+finance). Income is the log of the 1970 value. All other variables are countryspecific.
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TABLE 3.4 A:Income vs. Finance Thresholds
Dependent Variable: Average Property Rights, 1970 to 2005
(1)
(2)
Finance
0.713**
0.031
(0.28)
(0.19)
Finance * High Finance
0.338***
0.4***
(0.10)
(0.12)
Finance * High Income
-0.416***
0.011
(0.15)
(0.13)
Ethnic Fractionlization
0.001
0.004
(0.00)
(0.00)
Latitude
0.032***
0.038***
(0.01)
(0.01)
UK Legal Origin
0.631***
0.733***
(0.21)
(0.24)
Income
0.471**
0.241
(0.20)
(0.20)
R-squared
0.8157
0.7917

TABLE 3.4 B: Income vs. Finance Thresholds Coefficients on Finance in Various Regimes

Low Income
High Income

Significance of Coefficients from Column (1)
Significance of Coefficients from Column (2)
Low Finance
High Finance
Low Finance
High Finance
0.714**
1.052***
0.032
0.432***
(0.28)
(0.23)
(0.19)
(0.17)
0.298**
0.636***
0.043
0.444***
(0.15)
(0.16)
(0.24)
(0.18)

Notes: standard errors and p-values associated with linearity test reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at
10, 5 and 1 percent marked with *, **, ***, respectively. The dependent variable is the average of the Fraser
Institute’s property rights rating from 1970 to 2005. Financial development is also averaged over the sample period
and transformed as follows: log(1+finance). Income is the log of the 1970 value. All other variables are countryspecific.
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TABLE 3.5: Results from Panel Regressions
Dependent Variable: Property Rights Index, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005
(2)
(3a)
(3b)
(4a)
(4b)
(5a)
(5b)
Full Sample
Arellano-Bover Regressions Based on Sample Splits
Fixed Effects Arellano-Bover
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
0.282***
1.044***
0.197
2.032***
-0.386
1.723***
0.026
1.49***
(0.106)
(0.109)
(0.778)
(0.241)
(0.312)
(0.275)
(0.209)
(0.261)
0
0.276*
(0.205)
(0.148)
0.887***
1.704***
(0.227)
(0.237)
0.426
0.316
(0.615)
(0.336)
0.512**
-0.045
(0.245)
(0.047)
116
116
85
68
63
53
64
51
644
644
341
303
180
211
263
223
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.57)
(0.00)
(0.07)
(0.00)
(0.46)
(0.89)
(0.42)
(0.67)
(0.53)
(0.77)
(0.23)
(0.11)
(0.32)
(0.37)
(0.36)
(0.29)
(0.96)
(1.00)
(1)

Finance
Partisanship
Income
Trade Openness
Financial Integration
Number of Countries
Number of Observations
First Order Serial Correlation
Second Order Serial Correlation
Sargan Test

(6a)

(6b)

Low
-0.598**
(0.271)
0.189
(0.142)
1.135***
(0.243)
0.521
(0.584)
0.377
(0.231)
50
149
(0.00)
(0.23)
(1.00)

High
1.416***
(0.251)
0.043
(0.119)
1.953***
(0.266)
0.885
(0.595)
-0.076
(0.057)
40
167
(0.00)
(0.85)
(1.00)

Notes: The dependent variable is Fraser Institute index of property rights in country in time period
1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000,
2005. For each, , finance, partisanship, trade openness and financial integration are averages in the five preceding years, while income is
measured in 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000. Income is measured in logs and for our measure of financial development I take the
alternative transformation log(1+finance).
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TABLE 3.6. Threshold Regressions: Robustness to Alternative Measures

Panel A Measure of Finance: Private Credit to GDP
Cross Regime Restrictions
No Cross Regime Restrictions
Cato
Heritage Foundation
Cato
Heritage Foundation
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime:
Finance ≤ Finance > Finance ≤ Finance > Finance ≤ Finance > Finance ≤ Finance >
3.34
3.34
3.47
3.47
3.49
3.49
3.47
3.47
Effect of Finance
0.023 1.315***
0.219 1.038***
0.181 1.097***
0.431 0.800***
(0.16)
(0.29)
(0.32)
(0.34)
(0.15)
(0.29)
(0.30)
(0.36)
Number of Countries in Regime
58
43
59
46
58
43
59
46
p-value
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Panel B Measure of Finance: Liquid Liabilities to GDP
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime:
Finance ≤ Finance > Finance ≤ Finance > Finance ≤ Finance > Finance ≤ Finance >
3.73
3.73
3.38
3.38
3.73
3.73
3.80
3.80
Effect of Finance
-0.189 0.996*** 1.601*** 2.096***
-0.037
0.985**
0.435 1.217***
(0.34)
(0.33)
(0.55)
(0.36)
(0.34)
(0.38)
(0.49)
(0.39)
Number of Countries in Regime
59
30
34
59
59
30
54
39
p-value
(0.07)
(0.16)
(0.16)
(0.15)
Panel C Measure of Finance: Commerical Bank Assets / (Sum of Commerical and central Bank Assets)
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime: Regime:
Finance ≤ Finance > Finance ≤ Finance > Finance ≤ Finance > Finance ≤ Finance >
4.46
4.46
4.00
4.00
4.46
4.46
4.08
4.08
Effect of Finance
0.656*
7.959**
0.252 6.500***
0.692*
6.544
0.194 5.823***
(0.38)
(3.66)
(0.77)
(1.13)
(0.38)
(4.02)
(0.69)
(1.19)
Number of Countries in Regime
61
38
15
88
61
38
18
85
p-value
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)

Notes: standard errors and p-values associated with linearity test reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent
marked with *, **, ***, respectively. The dependent variables are the average value of the Fraser Institute index from 1970 to 2005
and the average of the Heritage Foundation index from 1995 to 2005. The regression specification follows the baseline model, where
each of the variables except finance is country-specific. Finance is measured as the log of the private credit to GDP ratio, the log of
liquid liabilities to GDP and the log of commercial assets to total bank assets. In each regression the relevant financial development
measure serves as the threshold variable. Estimation was performed in Gauss using a code adapted from Hansen (2000).
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Table 3.7 Data Appendix

Variable

Description
Measures of Property Rights

Fraser Institute Index

Rating of private property ranging from 0 to 10, higher values indicating stronger property
rights. Source: economic Gwartney, J., Hall, J., Lawson, R, (2009). Freedom of the world:
2009 annual report, Fraser Institute.

Heritage Foundation Index

Rating of private property ranging from 0 to 100 rescaled to 0 to 10; higher values
indicating stronger property rights. Source: the index of economic freedoms: freedom#8,
property rights, Heritage Foundation.

Measures of Financial Development
Private Credit

Credit supplied by financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by nominal GDP at
market prices. Financial structure database.

Liquid Liabilities

Ratio of broad money to nominal GDP. Financial structure database.

Bank Assets

Ratio of commercial bank domestic assets to the sum of commercial and central bank
domestic assets. Financial structure database.

Other Explanatory Variables
British Legal Origin
Ethnic Fractionalization
Distance from Equator
Mortality Rates
Constraints on the Executive

Religious Identity
Initial Income
Trade Openness
Financial Integration

Indicator for English common law tradition. Easterly (2001) original source La Porta et. al.,
1999.
Probability that two randomly selected individuals will not speak the same language.
Easterly (2001)..
Absolute value of the latitude of a country. Easterly (2001).
The log of mortality rates within European settlements. Acemoglu et. al. (2001).
Measures the feasibility of a change in government policy based on the presence of
independent branches of government with veto power. These data were drawn from Henisz
(2000). And updated from author’s web-site.
Primary religion—Catholicism. CIA world fact book.
Real GDP per capita adjusted for differences in purchasing power (series rgdpl, Penn world
tables 6.2).
Ratio of trade to GDP. World development indicators CD Rom (2002).
Financial integration is calculated as the sum of foreign assets and foreign liabilities divided
by GDP, using the External Wealth of Nations Mark II database of Lane and Milesi-Ferreti
(2006).
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FIGURE 3.1: Evolution of Finance and Property Rights over Time
Financial Development and Property Rights:
Countries Where Private Credit to GDP Less Than 30 Percent
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Notes: Starting in 1970, property rights data taken from the Fraser Institute are measured every five years,
while financial development is measured as the average volume of credit allocated to the private sector
over the five preceding years, i.e. from 1965-69, 1970-75, and so on. In each case, the chart plots the
median value of property rights and financial development.
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FIGURE 3.2 : Relationship between Finance and Property Rights (Property Rights are measured
as the Average from 1970 to 2005 of the Fraser Institute’s Index)

Notes: The plot is of the smooth function in (5) along with the 95% confidence bands. Estimation was performed in
R using the mgcv package Wood (2009).
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Chapter 4: Effects of collateral law reforms on access to finance
4.1

Introduction

It is well established both in theory and empirics that collateral reduces incidences of
credit rationing and facilitates efficient allocation of resources9. These benefits are particularly
large for developing countries where firms’ ability to put up collateral is limited (Liberti and
Mian, 2010) and credit markets are plagued with informational frictions (Luoto et al. 2004). A
study conducted for World Bank, covering 60 low and middle-income countries in Europe,
Central Asia and South Asia for the period 2001-2005, found that 70% percent of all rejected
loan applications by firms are due to insufficient collaterals (Fleisig, 2006). The same study
reported that nearly 31% of firms in South Asia and 20% in East Asia abstain from applying for
a loan in anticipation that their application will not meet lenders’ collateral requirements.
Naturally, the problem is more acute among the small firms due to their limited ability to provide
collaterals (Beck et al 2008, Schiffer & Weder 2001, Fleisig 2002).
In recent years, a number of policies have been put into motion in the low and the middle
income countries with the objective of easing credit constraints facing firms in these countries.
These reforms have drawn momentum from the facts that private firms in these countries own
only 20% of assets in land and buildings which account for nearly 73% of accepted collateral
(Fleisig et al. 2006). This is in sharp contrast with the standard procedure followed by lenders in
a developed financial market. For example, in the U.S., 50% of credit is secured by movable

9

Please refer to Coco (2000) for a survey on theoretical literature emphasizing the role of collateral in reducing
adverse selection and moral hazard problem in the credit market. Also refer to Steijvers and Voordeckers (2009),
Menkhoff et al., (2006), Hernandez-Cananovas and Martinez-Solano (2006), Chakraborty and Hu (2006), Brick and
Palia (2007), Lehmann and Neuberger (2001) and Jiménez (2006) for supporting empirical evidence.
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properties, and 99% of movable properties that are acceptable as collateral in the U.S. are
unacceptable in Nigeria (Affaki 2010).
The aforementioned legal reforms span across many countries and come in various forms
including setting up of collateral registries, modernizing existing registries or taking initiatives to
unify registries electronically across geographical regions. In other cases, the reforms were
intended to reduce transaction costs by relaxing existing stringent collateral laws that require
specific description of assets in the security arrangements. In this essay, my focus is on a set of
reforms that have allowed for a wider set of assets to be used as collateral. These assets include
movable and intangible properties which prior to the reforms were excluded from the list of
acceptable collaterals. In particular, I wish to examine the effects of such reforms on firms’
perceived access to finance in the twelve low and middle-income countries drawn from Latin
America, Eastern Europe, Africa and South Asia that have undergone reforms with the goal of
allowing intangible assets such as machinery, inventory, accounts receivables etc. to be used as
collateral.
For my analysis, I have drawn data from various sources. For example, I have used the
Enterprise Survey dataset published by World Bank to obtain firm-level data on perceived access
to finance and other characteristics of firms in 88 low and middle countries over the period 20012011. I have combined this information with the information on collateral law reforms drawn
from the Doing Business Reports published by World Bank which offers details about changes in
business regulations in 185 countries beginning 2004.

As additional controls I have used a

number of institutional and financial variables which are known to have bearing on firms’ access
to finance.
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The analysis yields a number of policy relevant findings. First, I find that broadening the
range of assets that can be used as collateral improves access to finance as perceived by firms.
However, these effects are more pronounced in cases where reforms are accompanied or
followed by movable collateral registries. This finding offers support to a recent study (Love et
al. 2013) which suggests that setting up movable collateral registries generates positive and
significant effects on bank loans, credit, over draft facility and interest rates. In addition, I find
that the positive effects of collateral reforms on firms’ perceived access to finance increase in the
firm size. This raises the possibility that the realized benefits of these reforms are misaligned
with the main goal of helping smaller firms.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, I layout the methodology
underlying the analysis. Section 3 describes the data on reform and the variables that I use in the
analysis. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes with some discussions.

4.2

Methodology:

The World Bank Enterprise Survey data is not longitudinal and does not track the same
set of firms over the years. This limits the possibility to rely on panel estimations. As an
alternative, I estimate the model using a two-way fixed effect linear regression model.10 This two
way fixed effects model is a generalization of the difference in difference models which are a
widely used identification strategy in applied econometrics. By using a group of non-reform
countries as the treatment group, this model attempts to identify the effects of reforms in the
control group of countries by controlling for cross sectional and time series variation. The use of
10

In the existing literature, following the seminal article by Abowd et al. (1999), the two-way- fixed effect models
have been used frequently in various contexts. For example, Abowd et al. (2009) and Woodcock (2008) have used
this model to analyze employer-employee data. Whereas, Kramarz et al. (2008) and Bennett (2010) have used the
methodology to analyze student-teacher data (and doctor-patient data, respectively. Also, please refer to Mittag
(2012) further discussions on estimation procedure.
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time series data for untreated (non-reform) countries, I am able to establish what would have
happened in the absence of intervention (in this case the collateral law reforms).
In particular, I consider the following specification:
(

)

Where ‘i’ indexes firm, ‘j’ indexes country and ‘t’ indexes the years. Access to finance, which is
our dependent variable, is denoted as

The set of firm-specific controls are denoted by

refers to country-level variables that are likely to influence firms’ access to finance. The year
fixed effects and the country fixed effects are denoted by

and

respectively. These dummies

control for the effect of any common time varying shock to the countries and the effects of time
invariant country specific fixed effects.
The idiosyncratic error is denoted as

. The usual assumption is that the latter is

independent and identically distributed which is often violated. A natural generalization is to
assume “clustered errors” i.e. that observations within group “i” are correlated in some unknown
way, inducing correlation in

within i. In the present context, to account for the possibility

that errors may be correlated across groups (countries), I have corrected the standard errors by
using country-level clusters (Bertrand et al 2004). This allows me to account for grouped errors
across individual firms. Possibility of errors to be correlated across time is less in this case due to
the lack of substantial time variation in our data.
My primary variable of interest is “Reform,” which, for country , takes the value equal
to 1 for the reform year and the subsequent years following reform. The coefficient

is my main

variable of interest which captures the effect of allowing movables and intangibles as collateral
on the perceived access to finance after controlling for firm and country specific controls.
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4.3

Data:

4.3.1 Data on Reform years:
I draw information about the dates and the details about country level reforms from the
World Bank’s Doing Business Report. The Doing Business Report is a widely used study
conducted by the World Bank on a yearly basis since 2004 that measures the costs to firms of
doing business. As of 2012, these reports covers 185 countries and offer detail information about
the costs, the requirements, and the procedures that a typical private firm encounters in these
countries. The reports also include information on a range of regulatory changes pertaining to
starting a business, obtaining construction permits, employing workers, registering property,
getting credit, protecting investors, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing a
business etc. It also includes information on changes in regulations pertaining to the setting up of
collateral reforms that are relevant for the present analysis. I use this information to isolate a list
of twelve countries that have allowed for movable and intangibles (for instance, machinery,
inventory, accounts receivables, etc.) to be used as mortgage during the last decade (2001-2011).
The list includes seven Eastern European countries (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Romania, Ukraine,
Estonia, Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia), two Latin American countries (Peru, Guatemala), two
Asian countries (Laos, Vietnam), and one African country (Rwanda). Table 4.1 provides
information on reform details and reform dates for these countries. The nature of the collateral
law reforms is different across these 12 countries. All the 12 countries expanded the range of
options available in collateral thus allowing for creation of collateral not just in
land/buildings/real estate but other movable assets, personal assets, intangibles (inventory and
accounts receivables) etc. However Peru, Guatemala, Rwanda and Ukraine also opened collateral
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registries in addition to the above mentioned reforms. These registries provide information on
collateral registered as well on the existing relationship between borrowers and lenders.

4.3.2 Data on Access to Finance:
The World Bank’s Enterprise Survey dataset provides firm-level data on access to
finance, which is the dependent variable in equation (1). The Enterprise Survey is a rich and
comprehensive data set that provides firm-level data from over 70,000 establishments from 120
countries. The data are collected through personal interviews with business owners, top
managers, and accounting officials of manufacturing and service sectors firms.

Formal

(registered) companies with 5 or more employees were considered for interview and. Also, those
firms with 100% government/state ownership were excluded from this process. I extract data
from two waves of survey during the period 2002-2011. There is a wide variation in the size of
the firms- 65% have less than 50 employees, 20% have 50 to 200 employees and the rest 15%
have more than 200 employees.
The Survey covers a wide range of topics related to the business environment, such as,
general business characteristics, infrastructure, services, sales, supplies, access to finance, degree
of competition, land, crime, business-government relations, investment climate constraints,
labor, and productivity. The questions are mostly objective and are aimed at measuring the
quality of the business environment. Less than 10% of the questions are subjective (asking the
respondent for his or her opinion). The ‘access to finance’ variable is based on one of such
subjective survey questions where firms were asked about their perception regarding the costs
(e.g interest costs and fees) and the availability of external finance. The goal of the question is
to get an idea about the extent to which availability of external finance poses as an obstacle to the
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operations and growth of the firms. The responses were sought on a scale from zero to four
where zero indicates no obstacles and four indicates the most severe obstacles faced by firms 11.
In Table 4.2 I present a brief description and the summary statistics on this variable along with
other explanatory variables.

4.3.3 Date on other control variables:
I also control for a number of financial, institutional and firm-specific information that
are relevant for our analysis. While the Enterprise survey data set remains as the source for the
firm-level variables, I use the World Bank’s financial structure data base and World Governance
Indicators for country-level institutional and financial variables. Here I provide details on some
of these variables and the rest of the details are included in the Table 4.3.
The firm-level variable audit is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if a firm has its
annual financial statement checked and certified by an external auditor and 0 otherwise. I include
this control as more transparency is likely to have a positive effect on the access to external
finance (Nguyen and Qian 2012). In the Enterprise Survey, the managers were also asked
whether or not they have confidence on the judicial system of the country when it comes to
protecting their property rights. The responses were rated from 1 (Fully Disagree) to 6 (Fully
agree). Since the strength of property rights are relevant for the financial development and the
availability of credit (La Porta et al 2002, Besley & Ghatak 2009, Beck et al 2005), I include
these responses as a control. Finally, the survey also includes a question on the ownership
structure of firms. Since, a firm’s ownership structure could influence its access to credit

11

During the first wave of survey, some countries (e.g., Ukraine, Estonia, Bosnia, Croatia and Romania) the
responses were measured using scale ranging from 0 to 3. Table 4.5 lists the particular years for which such scale
was used. I explicitly consider the implication of this variation in the measurement during our analysis.
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(Nguyen & Qian 2012, Love et al 2013), I include legal status as an additional control which
takes the value 1 if the firm is privately held and zero otherwise.
I recognize that, in addition to firm level characteristics, country-wide factors such as
institutional quality and the level of financial development could influence a firm’s access to
finance. Accordingly, I use the Index of Government Effectiveness from World Governance
Indicator Project of the World Bank as a control to capture the quality of legal environment and
the quality of institutions. This project reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for
215 economies over the period 1996–2012, and measures the quality of public services, the
quality of the civil service and its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to its
stated policies. The project ranks Government Effectiveness of countries on a scale -2.5 to 2.5,
with higher values indicating better governance.
To capture the level of financial development, I use three measures that are drawn from
the World Bank’s Financial Structure Database and are widely used in the literature (Beck et al.
2000). The first measure is the ratio of commercial bank assets to the sum of commercial and
central bank assets. This measure has been widely used as a proxy for financial development
since the pioneering contributions by King and Levine (1993). The second measure is the ratio of
liquid liabilities to GDP, which is considered as the broad indicator of financial deepening.
Finally, I use the volume of credit supplied by the financial system to the private sector (as a
ratio of GDP). In addition, I use the spread between the deposit rate and the lending rate of
commercial banks as an indicator for financial development (Hasellman et al 2006, Nguyen and
Qian 2012). A higher spread is usually associated with a tighter credit condition (Jimenesz et al
2004). Finally, I include growth rate of real per capita GDP as an additional control (Jimenesz et
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al 2004, Love et al 2013, Hasellman et al 2006) to capture any potential effect coming from
current macroeconomic condition to the credit market.

4.4 Results:
4.4.1 Access to Finance:
I begin by regressing perceived access to finance against the reform dummy. As additional
controls I include audit, legal status, judicial system, growth rate of GDP, interest rate spread and
government effectiveness. At this stage I do not differentiate between the types of reforms (e.g.
the reforms that have allowed intangible collateral versus reforms that have established collateral
registries). I report results in column 1 of the Table 4.4 with bank assets as a country-wide proxy
for financial development.
The findings suggest that some of the firm-specific characteristics matter for a firm’s access
to finance. For example, firms that are audited tend to have easier access to finance. Also,
private firms have easier access to finance. Similarly, higher growth, higher level of financial
development (as measured by bank assets), and lower interest rate spread improve firms’
perception about access to finance. There is also evidence that firms view external finance as a
lesser obstacle when they give higher ratings to the quality of the judicial system and property
rights institutions. Such a relationship, however, is absent in the case of country-wide index
measuring government effectiveness. I suspect that this is due to widely discussed weaknesses of
the broad

government

effectiveness

index

in

capturing true

institutional

qualities
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(Kraan,Manning, Malinska 2006).12 The absence of the result could also be due to strong
correlation between the country-wide index and the firm-level ‘Judicial System’ variable.
Most Notably, after controlling for fixed effects, common time trend and a wide range of
factors, the coefficient of the reform dummy is found to be -0.59 and significant at 1% level.
This implies that reforms improve firms’ perception about access to finance. For further insight, I
repeat the baseline regression by including a wider list of financial development indicators, one
at a time, and report the relevant coefficients in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.4. The coefficient
reduces in magnitude to -.0.46 and -0.36. But they continue to be significant at 1% and 5%
levels. Thus I find that in all these cases the association between the reform and the perceived
access to finance remains positive and statistically significant. In the WBES data, there are some
isolated cases where access to finance responses were measured by a 0 to 3 scale as opposed to a
0-4 scale that applies in most cases. As a robustness check, I re-run the regressions after
dropping some countries and reform years for which this anomaly applies13. The coefficients of
the reform dummy remains negative and significant. Further, as one might expect the size of the
coefficients are now larger than the benchmark results.

4.4.2 Effects of Firms’ Sizes:
There is ample evidence to suggest that, in comparison to the larger and the medium size
firms, the smaller firms face tighter credit constraints due to their limited ability to provide
collaterals. Therefore it is reasonable to form a hypothesis that the benefit of the reforms are
unlikely to be uniform across firm sizes and is the smaller firms are likely to benefit most from
12

Nguyen and Qian (2012) explored the determinants of collateralized borrowing using the same data set and
similar set of institutional controls. According to them, effect of country level institutional indicators on intensive
margin (collateral value) is muted and have very little effect on collateral value.
13
I dropped the reform countries Croatia and Romania entirely from the sample. I also removed years 2009 for
Bosnia and Estonia, and year 2008 for Ukraine.
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the reforms. In this section, I test this hypothesis by running the baseline regression separately
for small, medium and large firms. I define small, medium and large firms if the number of
permanent employees lies between 0-50, 50-200, and greater than 200, respectively. The results
are reported in column 1-3 of the Table 4.6. In all the cases, the coefficients of the reform
dummy remain significant and negative implying that the benefit of the reform accrues to firms
of all sizes. Interestingly, however, the magnitude of the coefficients increases with firm size14.
The coefficients increase from -.479 in case of small firms to -0.9 for large firms. The same
pattern emerges when I replace bank assets with other measures of financial development. In
fact, in the case of the private credit, the effects of reforms become insignificant for small firms.
These results render support to other findings (e.g, Lilienfeld-total et al 2012) where smaller
firms have experienced a contraction in credit and fixed assets, following a reform that
strengthened banks’ ability to enforce credit contracts. The results also raise a possibility that the
effects of reforms may not be aligned with its objective of helping smaller firms. As in the
previous section, I re-run the regressions after omitting cases where access to finance responses
were measured in a 0-3 scale. As shown in the Table 4.7, the same pattern prevails when I use
private credit and liquid liabilities as measures of financial development. In the case of bank
assets, the coefficient for medium firms is slightly higher than large firms, but both coefficients
are significantly larger than the coefficient for the small firms.

4.4.3 Effects of registry reforms:
In practice, collateral reforms that broaden the range collaterals must meet other criteria to
make an impact on firms’ access to finance. Among these, the most important one is the presence
14

As an alternative, also considered an interaction term between the reform dummy and the log of firm size. In tis
case the coefficient of interaction term appears insignificant. I suspect that this is due to the discontinuity in the
relationship between firm size and the access to finance.
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of an arrangement that notifies the parties about the existence of a security interest on an asset.
Collateral registries serve this purpose by disseminating information about the existing lien on
collaterals to potential lenders. It is already well-established that the presence of collateral
registries mitigates information frictions and facilitates loan transactions. For example, in a
recent study covering 73 countries Love et al (2013)) found that setting up movable collateral
registries have positive and significant effects on bank loans, credit, over draft facility and
interest rates.
In this section, I examine how the effects of collateral reforms vary in the presence and in the
absence of movable collateral registries. For this purpose, I split the sample of reform countries
into two groups. In the first group, broadening of the assets base were not accompanied or
followed by collateral registries (e.g. in Estonia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Romania,
Vietnam). Whereas in the second group, the reforms were accompanied or immediately followed
by establishment of collateral registries. (e.g., in Laos, Ukraine, Peru, Rwanda, Guatemala). I
estimate the baseline regression separately for these two groups and report the results in table
3.8. The findings are significantly different across the two groups.
For example, the results in Columns 1 and 2 show that after controlling for banks assets,
coefficient of reform dummy are negative and significant for those countries that did set up
movable collateral registries. For those who did not, the coefficient on reform dummy is
insignificant. These results are robust to the changes in the measure of financial development
(i.e., from bank asset to liquid liabilities and private credit). As before I re-run the regression
(Table 4.9) after making necessary adjustment in the data due to the variation in the response
scale. Although the results become less striking compared to the full sample case, the
coefficients of the reform dummy appear much larger for those with collateral registries when

71
bank assets and liquid liabilities are used as a proxy for financial development. In the case of
private credit, the results are in tune with those presented in the Table 4.8.
The above results are not surprising. While broadening the collateral base helps the
borrowers, registries play a significant role in allowing lenders to more accurately evaluate risks,
thus avoiding adverse selection. This reduces the information asymmetry between borrowers and
lenders, thus ensuring more accurate risk assessment and eventually expanding access to finance.
While broadening the range of assets that can be used as collateral increases the capital available
for borrowers, prevalence of registries expedites the financing process since lenders can now
assess the credit worthiness of borrowers with greater objectivity. This finding is well-supported
by other findings in the literature suggesting that the quality of information has bearing on the
cost and availability of credit (Love and Mylenko 2005, Brown et al 2009).

4.5 Conclusion:

Using firm-level survey data, this chapter offers evidence that reforms whose objective is
to enable the use of hitherto unused movable and intangible assets as collateral have a significant
and positive effect on firms’ perception towards access to finance. However, such effect is more
pronounced in countries where collateral reforms are accompanied by collateral registries for
movable assets. In addition, the results suggest that the effects of reform vary with firm sizes
with smaller firms benefiting the least. Thus the chapter provides evidence that the effects of
reforms could be misaligned with its main goal of helping smaller firms.
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TABLE 4.1: LIST OF REFORM YEARS

Country
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatia
Estonia
Vietnam
Serbia
Montenegro
Romania
Peru
Rwanda
Guatemala

Asset Reform*
2004
2006
2003
2006
2004
2004
2009
2006
2009
2008

Registry reform

Ukraine

2004

2004

Laos

2005

2005

2007
2009
2009

*Asset reform refers to countries broadening the range of assets that can be allowed as collateral
including movables and intangibles (Ex: Machinery, Inventory, Accounts receivables etc.).
Source: Doing Business Reports, World Bank 2004-2012
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TABLE 4.2: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable
Access to finance

Number of observations
129625

Mean
1.386716

Std. Dev
1.384289

Bank Assets
Liquid Liabilities
Private Credit
Interest rate spread
Growth rate of GDP
Government Effectiveness Index
Audit
Judicial System
Legal Status

78014
73011
73191
107212
137736
139677
137913
112202
117322

0.881683
0.46051
0.368895
-8.51739
3.731377
-0.18135
0.507653
0.468601
0.853156

0.146082
0.250821
0.292412
7.963535
4.337658
0.659227
0.503887
0.499015
1.281948

74
TABLE 4.3: DATA APPENDIX
Country Specific Explanatory Variables


Growth Rate: Growth rate of real per capita GDP; Source: World development Indicator



Spread: Commercial Bank Deposit rate -Lending rate: Source: Financial Structure Data Base



Private credit: Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions as a percent of GDP;
Source: Financial Structure Data Base



Bank assets: Ratio of deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank assets and central
bank assets; Source: Financial Structure Data Base



Liquid liabilities: Liquid liabilities as a percentage of GDP; Source: Financial Structure Data Base



Government effectiveness : Government effectiveness index: captures quality of public services, the
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures; Source: World Governance

Indicator Project

Firm Specific Explanatory Variables (Source: Enterprise Survey Data Base, World Bank)



Judicial System: Whether managers have confidence in judicial system of the country when it
comes to protecting their property rights Index (1=Fully Disagree to 6 =Fully agree).



Legal status: Current legal status of firm Index (1=Private firm, 0=Otherwise)



Audit: Does establishment have its annual financial statement reviewed by an external auditor Index
(1=Yes, 0=No)

Dependent Variable


Access to Finance: Is access to finance (interest cost, fees, collateral requirements) an obstacle for
operation and growth? [ Index: 0=No Obstacle, 1=Minor Obstacle, 2=Moderate Obstacle, 3=Major
Obstacle, 4=Very Severe Obstacle, Source: Enterprise Survey Data Base, World Bank]
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TABLE 4.4 (All reforms that broaden the range of collaterals)

Reform

Growth Rate

Spread

Audit

Judicial System

Legal status

Govt Effectiveness

Bank assets

Column 1

Column 2

Column 3

-0.5905405***

-0.4597301***

-0.35707**

(0.2064688)

(0.1571912)

(0.153763)

0.0054799

-0.0619213

-0.05322

(0.0147491)

(0.0381586)

(0.033631)

0.0495558**

0.0564563**

0.041197

(0.0228007)

(0.0255032)

(0.026877)

-0.1605669***

-0.1714065***

-0.17076***

(0.0354899)

(0.0328005)

(0.032679)

-0.2137367***

-0.2134632***

-0.21352***

0.0280231

0.0311452

0.031196

-0.0221522*

-0.0271717**

-0.0286**

0.0124339

0.0129239

0.012992

1.081896***

0.8175117**

1.104215***

0.2815831

0.3479874

0.321697

-3.042836***
1.007057

Liquid liabilities

-3.414755**
1.324107

Private credit

-1.69811*
0.855627

R Square

0.1146

0.1216

0.1213

N

27021

23916

23916

Notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent marked with *, **,
*** respectively. Dependent variable in al regressions is access to finance rated from 0 to 4. Coefficients of time,
country dummy and constant terms are not reported.
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TABLE 4.5 (Countries with access to finance rated from 0-3)

Country

Year of
Reform

Index of access to finance
Index of access to finance
(Post reform years)
(Pre reform years)

Estonia

2003

2002 (0-3)

2005 (0-3), 2009 (0-4)

Bosnia

2004

2002 (0-3)

2005 (0-3), 2009 (0-4)

Ukraine

2004

2002(0-3)

2005 (0-3), 2008 (0-4)

Croatia

2006

2002, 2005 (0-3)

2007 (0-4)

Romania

2009

2005 (0-3)

2009(0-4)
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TABLE 4.6: All reforms that broaden the range of assets of collateral, allowing for firm size variation

Reform

Growth Rate

Spread

Audit

Judicial system

Legal Status

Govt Effectiveness

Bank Assets

Column 1

Column 2

Column 3

Column 4

Column 5

Column 6

Column 7

Column 8

Column 9

Small

Medium

Large

Small

Medium

Large

Small

Medium

Large

-0.479**

-0.690*

-0.905***

-0.354**

-0.528**

-0.764***

-0.259

-0.417*

-0.537**

(0.203)

(0.357)

(0.265)

(0.161)

(0.243)

(0.269)

(0.168)

(0.241)

(0.233)

0.006

-0.001

0.023

-0.029

-0.103**

-0.092**

-0.020

-0.093**

-0.077*

(0.013)

(0.019)

0.016

(0.040)

(0.045)

(0.045)

(0.036)

(0.042)

(0.039)

0.038

0.065*

0.080**

0.041

0.064

0.072*

0.025

0.049

0.056

(0.023)

(0.035)

(0.035)

(0.027)

(0.040)

(0.040)

(0.027)

(0.045)

(0.047)

-0.134***

-0.047

-0.155**

-0.129***

-0.070

-0.168**

-0.128***

-0.069

-0.163**

(0.032)

(0.058)

(0.058)

(0.032)

(0.062)

(0.064)

(0.032)

(0.061)

(0.064)

-0.225***

-0.166***

-0.146**

-0.227***

-0.158***

-0.137**

-0.227***

-0.158***

-0.136**

(0.036)

(0.041)

(0.057)

(0.039)

(0.036)

(0.054)

(0.039)

(0.036)

(0.055)

-0.030*

0.000

0.019

-0.038**

-0.018

0.028

-0.040**

-0.018

0.026

(0.015)

(0.022)

(0.021)

(0.015)

(0.022)

(0.024)

(0.015)

(0.022)

(0.024)

1.006***

0.664

1.855***

0.578

0.755

2.192***

0.842**

1.009*

2.422***

(0.303)

(0.420)

(0.291)

(0.358)

(0.510)

(0.582)

(0.324)

(0.499)

(0.635)

-2.666**

-3.253**

-4.076***

(1.130)

(1.307)

(0.952)
-3.149*

-3.272*

-4.640***

(1.576)

(1.825)

(1.585)
-1.978**

-1.591

-1.101

(0.868)

(1.214)

(1.118)

Liquid Liabilities

Private Credit

R Square

0.1168

0.1372

0.1294

0.1176

0.1501

0.1469

0.1178

0.1498

0.1455

N

17359

5679

3983

15606

5004

3306

15606

5004

3306

Notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent marked with *, **,
*** respectively. Dependent variable in al regressions is access to finance rated from 0 to 4. Small, medium and
large refers to firm sizes. Their shares are approximately 60%, 30% and 10% . Coefficients of time, country dummy
and constant terms are not reported.
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TABLE 4.7: All reforms that broaden the range of assets of collateral, allowing for firm size variation
Results shown after adjustments made for countries where access to finance rated from 0-3

Reform

Growth Rate

Spread

Audit

Judicial System

Legal Status

Govt Effectiveness

Bank Assets

Column 1

Column 2

Column 3

Column 4

Column 5

Column 6

Column 7

Column 8

Column 9

Small

Medium

Large

Small

Medium

Large

Small

Medium

Large

-0.751***

-1.392***

-1.377***

-0.615**

-1.132***

-1.215***

-0.561*

-1.114***

-1.136**

(0.166)

(0.412)

(0.395)

(0.257)

(0.365)

(0.496)

0.314

(0.375)

(0.472)

0.002

-0.006

0.014

-0.061

-0.161**

-0.150**

-0.034

-0.124**

-0.090

(0.012)

(0.015)

(0.012)

(0.062)

(0.067)

(0.061)

(0.054)

(0.053)

(0.058)

0.017

0.007

0.021

0.017

0.007

0.006

-0.003

-0.015

-0.030

(0.033)

(0.025)

(0.042)

(0.039)

(0.042)

(0.064)

(0.029)

(0.037)

(0.066)

-0.140***

-0.047

-0.150**

-0.137***

-0.071

-0.156**

-0.137***

-0.072

-0.153**

(0.033)

(0.061)

(0.062)

(0.033)

(0.068)

(0.072)

(0.033)

(0.067)

(0.071)

-0.222***

-0.164***

-0.131**

-0.224***

-0.150***

-0.106**

-0.224***

-0.150***

-0.104*

(0.038)

(0.042)

(0.058)

(0.042)

(0.034)

(0.052)

(0.042)

(0.034)

(0.052)

-0.029*

0.004

0.025

-0.035**

-0.009

0.041

-0.035**

-0.010

0.040

(0.015)

(0.024)

(0.022)

(0.016)

(0.025)

(0.025)

(0.016)

(0.025)

(0.026)

0.992***

0.509

1.646***

0.661*

0.902*

2.363***

0.879***

1.076**

2.425***

(0.322)

(0.485)

(0.394)

(0.366)

(0.491)

(0.594)

(0.298)

(0.481)

(0.613)

-2.562*

-2.603*

-3.453***

(1.292)

(1.452)

(1.142)

-3.100

-3.026*

-4.845**

(2.024)

(1.734)

(1.915)

-1.753*

-0.946

-0.648

(1.006)

(1.037)

(1.165)

Liquid Liabilities

Private Credit

R Square

0.119

0.143

0.132

0.121

0.159

0.143

0.121

0.159

0.152

N

16641

5417

3796

14530

4614

3052

14530

4614

3052

Notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent marked with *, **,
*** respectively. Coefficients of time, country dummy and constant terms are not reported.
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TABLE 4.8: Comparison between countries with and without registry reforms
Dependent variable in all regressions is access to finance rated from 0 to 4.
Column 1

Column 2

Column 3

Column 4

Column 5

Column 6

Registry

No Registry

Registry

No Registry

Registry

No Registry

Reform

-1.157232***

-0.2059084

-1.320104***

-0.1036104

-1.506299***

0.1184464

(0.22548)

(0.24898)

(0.22890)

(0.11406)

(0.26761)

(0.08352)

Growth Rate

0.0026659

0.0061405

-0.0747666

-0.0505459

-0.027646

-0.0301768

(0.01103)

(0.01231)

(0.05583)

(0.03867)

(0.05469)

(0.03572)

Spread

-0.000722

0.0108528

-0.0043797

-0.0002926

-0.0389867**

-0.0364339***

(0.03085)

(0.02711)

(0.02625)

(0.01553)

(0.01695)

(0.01318)

Audit

-0.1653478***

-0.1669229***

-0.177713***

-0.1792511***

-0.1785355***

-0.1772756***

(0.03734)

(0.03657)

(0.03432)

(0.03336)

(0.03426)

(0.03315)

-0.2104273***

-0.2165384***

-0.205844***

-0.2163867***

-0.2056638***

-0.215884***

(0.02930)

(0.02961)

(0.03271)

(0.03284)

(0.03276)

(0.03296)

-0.01864

-0.01848

-0.019922

-0.0214351

-0.0202433

-0.0221177

Judicial System
Legal Status

(0.01322)

(0.01292)

(0.01442)

(0.01325

(0.01455)

(0.01329)

Govt Effectiveness

0.8571447***

0.783192***

0.5137393

0.407715

0.6999543**

0.6938467***

(0.30941)

(0.28610)

(0.33758)

(0.29398

(0.27505)

(0.21951)

Bank Assets

-2.346202*

-2.136734*

(1.18520)

(1.08939)
-4.190923**

-4.560745***

(1.62785)

(1.14228)
-2.657105***

-3.008883***

(0.97171)

Liquid Liabilities
Private Credit
R Square

0.1145

0.1215

N

25539

25069

0.1237

0.1313

0.1238

(0.76944)
0.1316

21881

21964

21881

21964

Notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent marked with *, **,
*** respectively. Dependent variable in al regressions is access to finance rated from 0 to 4. Coefficients of time,
country dummy and constant terms are not reported.
All the countries have broadened the range of assets that can be used as collateral including movables and
intangibles. Columns 1,3 and 5 include countries who have additionally opened up movable collateral registries,
whereas columns 2, 4 and 6 include countries who have not .
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TABLE 4.9: Comparison between countries with and without registry reforms
Dependent variable in all regressions is access to finance rated from 0 to 3.
Column 1

Column 2

Column 3

Column 4

Column 5

Column 6

Registry

No Registry

Registry

No Registry

Registry

No Registry

-1.157232***

-0.6153103***

-1.320104***

-0.3114887*

-1.506299***

-0.0630453

(0.2255)

(0.1396)

(0.2289)

(0.1761)

(0.2676)

(0.2515)

Growth Rate

0.0026659

0.0012096

-0.0747666

-0.120302

-0.027646

-0.05413

(0.0110)

(0.0116)

(0.0558)

(0.0611)

(0.0547)

(0.0620)

Spread

-0.000722

-0.0406707**

Reform

-0.0026843

-0.0043797

-0.0009409

-0.0389867**

(0.0309)

(0.0317)

(0.0263)

(0.0276)

(0.0170)

(0.0179)

Audit

-0.1653478***

-0.1726278***

-0.177713***

-0.1870579***

-0.1785355***

-0.1878992***

(0.0373)

(0.0384)

(0.0343)

(0.0342)

(0.0343)

(0.0343)

Judicial System

-0.2104273***

-0.2088898***

-0.2129281***

-0.205844***

-0.2099667***

-0.2056638***

(0.0293)

(0.0308)

(0.0327)

(0.0344)

(0.0328)

(0.0346)

Legal Status

-0.01864

-0.0188878

-0.019922

-0.0199631

-0.0202433

-0.0201682

(0.0132)

(0.0136)

(0.0144)

(0.0148)

(0.0146)

(0.0148)

Govt Effectiveness

0.8571447***

0.8037627***

Bank Assets

0.8373018***

0.5137393

0.6094859*

0.6999543**

(0.3094)

(0.2954)

(0.3376)

(0.3356)

(0.2751)

(0.2600)

-2.346202*

-2.221588*

(1.1852)

(1.1597)
-4.190923**

-4.984427***

(1.6279)

(1.6939)
-2.657105***

-2.768359**

(0.9717)

(1.0856)

Liquid Liabilities
Private Credit

R Square

0.1145

0.1239

0.1237

0.1362

0.1238

0.1359

N

25539

23902

21881

20244

21881

20244
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